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1. Introduction
While the first academic articles on philanthropy appeared in the 1960s, there
has been an explosion of interest in the economics of philanthropy and charitable
giving since the 1980s. Hundreds of articles have been written to explore and
extend various theoretical findings, and hundreds more have pursued empirical
questions. This chapter will, by necessity, address only a small subset of these
papers, focussing only on the most central themes. I will do my best to acknowl-
edge the original sources for the findings discussed, and through comments and
footnotes direct the reader to the broader literature. Even then, I am afraid, this
will be something of a stingy review of a rather generous literature.1
Philanthropy is one of the greatest puzzles for economics. A science based on
precepts of self-interested behavior does not easily accommodate behavior that is
so clearly unselfish. How can unselfish behavior be reconciled with self-interest?
One explanation is that charitable giving is not unselfish at all. One who
gives to medical research may hope one day to benefit from its findings. A person
who gives to public broadcasting may expect to enjoy improved programming.
A benefactor of the opera may seek to hire more talented performers. A second
justification, sometimes called “enlightened self-interest,”is a step removed from
pure selfishness. A comfortably employed person may give to poverty relief in
order to keep the institution in place, banking on the rare event that he may
himself be impoverished some day. But these clearly cannot be full explanations.
What about the person who gives to famine relief on another continent? Or the
environmentalist who contributes to saving a rare species that she never expects to
see? And what about charitable bequests–such gifts have no chance of aﬀecting
consumption of a person while alive. These examples raise a third explanation:
Altruism toward others or toward future generations may be a motivator in giving,
and gifts are made to maximize a utility function that includes the benefits to
others or to society in general. While these three explanations are distinct, an
economic theorist would model them all the same. Since each implies a concern
about the total supply of the charitable good or service, albeit for diﬀerent reasons,
each could be modelled identically as private gifts to a pure public good.2
1Pun intended.
2Hochman and Rodgers (1969) are credited with first noting that altruistic feelings can
translate the object of those feelings into a public good, but see also Kolm (1969). Arrow (1972)
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Notice that all three of these explanations are best suited to situations in which
one’s own contribution has a measurable impact on the charitable good. When the
good is large in scale and when donors are many, it becomes diﬃcult to accept
that people can actually experience the impact of their gifts. As a result, free
riding may predominate. In these cases, a fourth explanation for giving may be
more attractive: People may get utility–a “warm-glow”–from the act of giving.
A fifth possibility is that our economic discipline of self-interested behavior
is simply not well suited to explain philanthropy. Humans are, after all, moral
beings. Perhaps our behavior is constrained by moral codes of conduct that make
our choices unexplainable by neo-classical models of well-behaved preferences and
quasi-concave utility functions.3 While this argument undoubtedly has merit, it
represents the last refuge for the economic theorist. Since the models we discuss
below are capable of characterizing the data on giving, we hold oﬀ on considering
non-utility-based models of giving.
Regardless of the reasons for its existence, there is clearly a strong public
policy interest in philanthropy. First, private philanthropy can substitute for
public sector provision of goods and services. With individuals to provide poverty
relief or support for the arts, there is less need for the government to do so. As
such, it becomes essential to understand how private charity is provided and how
it interacts with public provision. Second, governments have historically treated
charitable donations with tax-favored policies, such as the charitable deduction
in the US. What are the eﬀects of these policies on giving and on tax collections?
Third, there are obviously enormous eﬃciency concerns. How is this set of public
and private institutions co-existing to provide public charitable services, and is
there a more eﬃcient configuration of these institutions? What is the best policy
for providing public goods?
This chapter will address these and other aspects of charitable giving. The
focus will be on making readers familiar with the basic tools of analysis, and
presenting them with most current state of research on these topics. Perhaps
most importantly, I will try to uncover important questions, topics and themes
that have not been addressed or understood, and point readers to potentially
fruitful new areas of inquiry. Despite being an extensively studied and important
provided a thoughtful discussion of the main issues for analysis, as did Boulding (1973). Becker
(1974) formalized the discussion and began the modern literature on altruistic giving to charity.
See the chapters in this volume by Schokkaert and by Kolm for other discussion of transfer
motives.
3Sugden (1982, 1984) suggests this interpretation. See also Sen (1977).
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topic, there is still a great deal to be learned about altruism, giving, charity and
how government policy aﬀects it all.
2. General Facts on Philanthropy
Here we will review the general facts about charitable giving. Most of what we
know about philanthropy is based on data from the US. For this reason, much of
our discussion will focus on American data. Later in this section we will look at
evidence and data from around the world.
2.1. Giving in the USA
There are two main sources of data about individual contributions to charity. The
first is household surveys. The Independent Sector, for instance, surveys about
2,500 households by telephone every two years.4 Surveys are valuable since they
can obtain information on age, education levels, and other personal characteristics
of respondents. A disadvantage is that individuals must rely on imprecise memo-
ries when answering questions, or may be reluctant to give accurate information
about their incomes or donations.
A second important source is samples of tax returns. Since individuals who
itemize their tax returns in the US can take a charitable deduction, we can learn
about donations from this sector of the economy. The advantage to tax returns
is that the information on them is precise, as long as people don’t cheat on their
taxes.5 The disadvantage is that tax returns contain very little information about
the personal characteristics of the filers that would be helpful in explaining giving,
such as education levels or religious aﬃliation, nor can we learn about the giving
habits of those who don’t itemize their tax returns. Since no data source is perfect,
we must conduct many studies on varied data sources in order to reach a consensus
on charitable behavior.
Charitable donations can come from individuals, charitable foundations, cor-
porations, or through bequests. While all are significant, by far the dominant
source of giving is from individuals. Table 1 shows that in 2002 individuals gave
4See their web-site for details about the survey and information about purchasing the data:
www.independentsector.org/
5Slemrod (1989) explored this potential problem and found that, while there is some evidence
of cheating by overstating charitable deductions, the eﬀects are small and don’t appreciably
aﬀect the analysis. Joulfaian and Rider (2004), however, found that tax evasion by misreporting
income can bias coeﬃcients, as evasion and marginal tax rates tend to be correlated.
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over 183 billion dollars to charity, or 76% of the total dollars donated. The second
biggest source, foundations, was responsible for 11.2% of all donations (also see
Greene and McClelland, 2001).
Table 1
Sources of Private Philanthropy, 2002
Source of gifts Billions Percent
of dollars of total
Individuals 183.7 76.3
Foundations 26.9 11.2
Bequests 18.1 7.5
Corporations 12.2 5.1
Total for all Sources 240.9 100
Source: Giving USA, 2003
The trends in giving over the last 30 years can be seen in Figure 1. Total giving
has been on a steady rise, with temporary jumps coming in 1986, along with a
pronounced rise starting in 1996 through 2001. When measured as a percent of
income, however, giving seems much more stable. Since 1968 giving has varied
from 1.5% to 2.1% of income. In the most recent years, however, giving has risen
from 1.5% of income in 1995 to 2.1% in 2001. This rise coincided with a run up
on stock-market wealth, which is the likely explanation for the latest increase in
giving. Notice, however, that this latest rise in giving counteracts a longer trend of
slowly falling generosity. The peak of giving in 2001 matches the former peak set
back in 1963. Table 2 presents details on the characteristics of individual givers.
The data, from the Independent Sector in 1995, show that 68.5% of all households
gave to charity and that the average gift among those giving was $1081. Table
2 shows that the more income a household has, the more likely the household is
to give to charity, and the more it gives when it does donate. This table also
reveals an interesting pattern typically found in charitable statistics. Those with
the lowest incomes give over 4% of income to charity. As incomes grow to about
$50,000, gifts fall to 1.3% of income, but then rise again to 3.0% for the highest
incomes. What could cause this “u-shaped” giving pattern? One explanation is
that those with low incomes may be young people who know their wages will be
rising, hence they feel they can aﬀord more giving now. It may also be due to
the composition of the types of charities people give to, since lower income people
tend to give significantly more to religious causes. Hence, it will be important to
4
account for all the factors that may explain giving before oﬀering explanations for
the averages seen in these tables.
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Figure 1: Trends in Individual Giving.
Source: Giving USA 2003.
Table 2 also illustrates that giving varies significantly with the age and ed-
ucational attainment of the givers. As people get older they are typically more
likely to give to charity and to give a greater fraction of their incomes. Likewise,
those with more education give more often, give more dollars, and generally give
a higher fraction of income. Note that the table does not show a smooth accel-
eration of giving with age. Again, age, education, and income all vary with each
grouping in the table and will have to be considered jointly.
In 1997 over 45,000 charitable, religious and other non-profit organizations
filed with the US government (see Bilodeau and Steinberg in this volume). Table
3 attempts to categorize these charities by the types of services they provide.
This reveals that, among all types, households are most likely to give to religious
5
organizations and to give them the most money–48% of all households give to
religion and 59% of all charitable dollars go to religion.
Table 2
Private philanthropy by income, age, and education of the giver, 1995
Percent of Average Percent of
households amount given by household
who give those who give income
All contributing households 68.5 1,081 2.2
Household Income
under $10,000 47.3 324 4.8
10,000—19,000 51.1 439 2.9
20,000—29,999 64.9 594 2.3
30,000—39,999 71.8 755 2.2
40,000—49,999 75.3 573 1.3
50,000—59,999 85.5 1,040 1.9
60,000—74,999 78.5 1,360 2.0
75,000-99,999 79.7 1,688 2.0
100,000 or above 88.6 3,558 3.0
Age of Giver
18—24 years 57.1 266 0.6
25—34 years 66.9 793 1.7
35—44 years 68.5 1,398 2.6
45—54 years 78.5 979 1.8
55—64 years 71.7 2,015 3.6
65—74 years 73.0 1,023 2.9
75 years and above 58.6 902 3.1
Highest Education of Giver
Not a high school graduate 46.6 318 1.2
High school graduate 67.2 800 1.9
Some college 74.1 1,037 2.1
College graduate or more 82.3 1,830 2.9
Source: Author’s calculations, data from Independent Sector 1995.
6
Table 3
Private Philantropy by Type of Charitable Organization, 1995.
Percent Average amount Percent of total
of Households given by household
Type of Charity who give those who give contributions
Arts, culture and humanities 9.4 221 2.6
Education 20.3 335 9.0
Environment 11.5 110 1.6
Health 27.3 218 8.1
Human Services 25.1 285 9.5
International 3.1 293 1.1
Private and 6.1 196 1.4
community foundations
Public or Societal benefit 10.3 127 1.7
Recreation 7.0 161 1.4
Religious 48.0 946 59.4
Youth Development 20.9 140 3.8
Other 2.1 160 0.3
Source: Author’s calculations, data from Independent Sector, Giving and Volunteering, 1995.
2.2. International Statistics
A diﬃcult aspect of comparing data from across countries is the varied sources
of information and the inconsistent definitions of charitable giving and non-profit
organizations. Using data from Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector
Project6, we can nonetheless attempt to gain some perspective on the diﬀering
size of the charitable sectors of various economies.
Figure 2 shows reports of cash revenues of non-profits from philanthropy. The
experience varies widely around the globe. The US, however, stands out as being
the most reliant on private donations, at 21 percent of all revenues. With the
exception of Spain, European countries are much lower, varying from 3 to 11
percent. The South American countries of Argentina and Brazil rely heavily on
philanthropy (about 18 percent), while Mexico does not (6 percent).
6See their web-site, http://www.jhu.edu/~cnp/.
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Figure 2: Percentage of Cash Revenues of the Nonprofit Sector Received from
Philanthropy: 1995.
Figure 3 provides a diﬀerent perspective by looking at the total expenditures
of the non-profit sector. Here the US falls closer to the middle of the pack, at 7.5
percent of GDP. The Netherlands and Israel have the largest non-profit sectors,
while Mexico and Brazil have the smallest.
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Figure 3: Nonprofit Sector Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP: 1995.
3. Theoretical Foundation
This section outlines the basic theoretical foundations for philanthropy. Hochman
and Rogers (1969) and Kolm (1969) were the first to recognize that charitable
giving, motivated out of altruism, creates a public good out of charity. Even if,
for instance, the recipients of the charitable services are individuals and are given
private goods, such as income transfers, day care, or housing, the fact that others
feel altruistically toward these individuals means that the private consumption of
these charity recipients becomes a public good.
Similar arguments hold for other charities that provide private goods. Edu-
cation dollars benefit the students and faculty of the institution, but because the
donors also take pride in the quality of the institution, the donations act as public
goods. Gifts to health care will benefit the patients of hospitals, and medical
research will help those with particular maladies, but the fact that givers value
these outcomes in general again makes them into public goods. Similarly with
9
the arts. The patrons of the museum or opera will get the direct benefits of any
gifts, but the fact that the giver values these benefits received by others makes
the donations public goods to the donors.
We begin our theoretical analysis, therefore, with a discussion of privately
provided public goods.
3.1. A Model of Private Giving to Public Goods
Let’s start with the simplest model without government or foundations, in which
only individuals are providing the good through voluntary donations.7 Assume
that there are i = 1, ..., n individuals in the economy. Each individual i consumes
a composite private good xi and a public good G. Let an individual’s donation
to the public good be gi and define G =
Pn
i=1 gi. Since G is a pure public good,
we assume preferences are ui(xi, G). For simplicity, assume the public good can
be produced from the private good with a simple linear technology, and that both
goods are measured in the same units.8 Finally, assume each person is endowed
with money income mi. Then each person faces the optimization problem
max
xi,gi
u(xi, G) (3.1)
s.t. xi + gi = mi
G =
nX
j=1
gj
gi ≥ 0
We solve this model by assuming a Nash equilibrium. That is, we assume each
person i solves (3.1) taking the contributions of the others as given.9 Let G−i =
7There are many antecedents to this model, but Becker (1974) deserves the primary credit
for this formulation of the problem. The most thorough treatment of this model, however, is
given in the extremely important work of Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986). Their paper
is the basis for this subsection.
8We could, alternatively, assume a concave technology that converts x to a public good G0.
For instance, G0 = F (G), F 0 > 0, F 00 < 0. However, if we embed this in a quasi-concave
utility function, u = v(xi, G0) = v(xi, F (G)) = u(xi,G), this utility function can absorb the
technological concavity. Hence, the assumption of a linear technology is consistent with an
assumption of a public good provided with increasing marginal cost and a quasi-concave utility.
However, if the function F (G) exhibits a range of increasing returns, special care will be needed.
See Andreoni (1998) and section 9.1 below.
9As before, the pun is entirely intentional.
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P
j 6=i gj = G− gi equal the total contributions of all individuals except person i.
Then under the Nash assumption, each person i treats G−i as independent of gi
when solving (3.1). Notice that this implies that each individual is behaving as
though they are “topping up” the charitable good from G−i to their own most
desired level G. To see this, add G−i to both sides of the budget constraint in
(3.1), and to the third constraint. Then we can rewrite the optimization problem
with each individual choosing G rather than gi:
max
xi,G
u(xi, G) (3.2)
s.t. xi +G = mi +G−i
G ≥ G−i.
This formulation highlights an important implication of public goods models,
first noted by Becker (1974), that each individual acts as though their “social
income” were mi + G−i. In other words, mi and G−i have the same marginal
eﬀect on an individual’s optimal G.
To write our solution, first solve (3.2) by ignoring the inequality constraint,
G ≥ G−i. In this case, find a solution to (3.2) from setting the marginal rate
of substitution equal to 1, that is (∂ui/∂G)/(∂ui/∂xi) = 1. Solving this we find
individual supply equations G = fi(mi+G−i) or, equivalently, gi = fi(mi+G−i)−
G−i. However, since we assume that people can only give positive amounts to the
public good, we must write the individual’s best reply function as
gi = max{fi(mi +G−i)−G−i, 0} (3.3)
Finally, we assume that the public good is a normal good and the private
good is strictly normal for all individuals. That is, there exists a θ such that
0 < f 0i ≤ θ < 1 for all i in the set of givers.10 This assumption is suﬃcient to
guarantee that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3.1. A Nash Equilibrium is a partition of the set of individuals
into a set of givers S and of non-givers S0, such that for all i ∈ S, gi = fi(mi +
G−i)−G−i ≥ 0, and for all j ∈ S0, gj = 0 and fj(mj +G−j)−G−j < 0.
Proposition 3.2. A Nash equilibrium exists and is unique.
10The parameter θ is needed to show that as n goes to infinity there is an equilibrium level
of the public good. Without this, there may be no bound to G in equilibrium.
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Proof:(a) Existence. Define the set B = {(g1, g2, ..., gn) : 0 ≤ gi ≤ mi}. Define
F = (f1, f2, ..., fn) : (g1, g2, ..., gn) → (g1, g2, ..., gn) as a mapping from the set B
into itself. Since F is continuous, we apply Brouwer’s fixed point theorem to
show an equilibrium exists. (Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian, 1986).
(b) Uniqueness: By normal goods, F is a contraction mapping. Hence, the
equilibrium is unique. (Fraser 1992, and Cornes, Hartley, Sandler, 1999). ||
The decision problem and Nash equilibrium can be illustrated in Figure 4.
The “endowment point” can be seen where consumption xi = mi and the public
good G = G−i. As the individual decides to give, xi can be traded for more G
along the 45-degree line. In equilibrium, all individuals consume the same G but,
assuming diﬀerent preferences and incomes, diﬀerent xi.11
x
G
i
Gg
x i
i
*
**
mi
iG-
Figure 4: Nash Equilibrium in the Private Provision of Public Goods
This is basically the classic model of Samuelson (1954) applied to voluntary
giving. Along with this is the other classic finding that private giving will not be
11Note, however, that if all individuals have the same preferences, then all givers must also have
the same consumption in equilibrium, even if they have diﬀerent incomes. This is easy to show:
In equilibrium all have the same G. They also are all optimizing so that the MRS(xi, G) = 1.
But if MRS(xi,G) =MRS(xj , G) then xi = xj .
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Pareto eﬃcient. According to the Samuelson conditions, G reaches the eﬃcient
level when the sum of the marginal rates of substitution equal the marginal cost,
that is
Pn
i=1(∂ui/∂G)/(∂ui/∂xi) =
Pn
i=1MRSi = 1. However, we know that
each giver is setting MRSi = 1, hence
Pn
i=1MRSi is in excess of 1 whenever
at least one person is giving (and G is a good for all others), implying ineﬃ-
ciently low G. This ineﬃciency can justify the involvement of the government in
providing public goods. Either by direct grants or subsidies to private giving,
government involvement was thought to be an eﬃciency-enhancing supplement
to private charitable markets. This suggests a partnership between government
and private donors. However, upon closer examination, natural extensions of this
model call into question the assumption that the government can supplement or
encourage private donations. We discuss this next.
3.2. Neutrality: Crowding Out
In 1984 Russell Roberts (Roberts, 1984) made a bold assertion in the Journal of
Political Economy: The great expansion of government services for the poor since
the Great Depression was accompanied by an equal decline in charitable giving for
the poor, with the result that the government dollars had no net eﬀect on allevi-
ating poverty. The same was true, he claimed, for all public-private partnerships
in providing public goods. His empirical evidence was all impressionistic, and his
main basis for his assertion was theoretical.
Roberts’ claims were built upon a model of Warr (1982). Warr showed that
any “small” lump sum tax on donors that is contributed to the public good will
completely crowd out private donations. The substitution will be dollar-for-
dollar. In fact, given the set up in (3.2), this eﬀect is trivial to show.
Begin with the case of no government intervention. Let (g∗1, g
∗
2, ..., g
∗
n) be the
vector of equilibrium private contributions to the public good. Now introduce
taxation. Let ti be a lump sum tax on person i, with the proceeds donated to the
public good. The individual’s budget constraint is then xi + gi + ti = mi. Now
each individual’s donation will be the sum of the voluntary donation gi and the
involuntary donation ti. Call this total donation yi = gi + ti. Likewise, define
Y =
Pn
i=1 yi, and Y−i =
P
j 6=i yj. Then it is easy to see that the optimization
13
problem (3.2) can be rewritten as
max
xi,Y
u(xi, Y ) (3.4)
s.t. xi + Y = mi + Y−i
Y ≥ Y−i + ti
Notice that this optimization problem (3.4) is identical to (3.2), with two
exceptions. First, G and G−i have been replaced by Y and Y−i. However, this
is only a change in notation and not a real change in the optimization problem.
Hence, as long as the solution to (3.2) without taxation is feasible in (3.4) with
taxation, then it too should be an equilibrium. This is where the second diﬀerence
comes in: The inequality constraint in (3.4) now includes a ti, which guarantees
that gi ≥ 0. When will the solution without taxation be feasible with taxation?
Whenever ti ≤ g∗i , that is, whenever the lump sum tax is no greater than the
original equilibrium contribution. In this case the equilibrium is y∗i = g
∗
i , so
that the new equilibrium gift, say g0i, will be g
0
i = g
∗
i − t. In equilibrium, therefore,
everyone will reduce their voluntary contribution by the amount of the involuntary
contribution in order to keep their total utility maximizing contribution the same.
This demonstrates the next proposition, shown by Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian
(1986):
Proposition 3.3. Complete Crowding Out. Let (g∗1, g
∗
2, ..., g
∗
n) be the Nash
equilibrium donations with no government taxation. Then if lump sum taxes
0 ≤ ti ≤ g∗i for all i are donated to the public good, the equilibrium donation
after taxation will be g0i = g
∗
i − ti for all i, and the total supply of the public good
will be unchanged.
Intuitively, the reason that crowding out is complete is that the model assumes
that people are indiﬀerent between voluntary giving gi and involuntary giving ti.
In equilibrium, each person is acting as though they are choosing their total gift,
yi = gi + ti, so that if one element of the sum is forced to move in one direction,
the other element will respond with and equal and opposite change.
This intuition is illustrated in Figure 5. This shows a lump sum tax that is
completely neutral–the eﬀect is simply to erase part of the budget set that was
not being selected. Notice that if the tax were to rise to t = g∗ = m− x∗, then
this person’s private contribution would be driven to zero. Any tax beyond this
would be non-neutral and would force total giving to rise.
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Figure 5: Complete Crowding Out
Of course, a good deal of taxation involves individuals who are not givers
or for whom ti > gi. What happens to the equilibrium Y when this happens?
Naturally enough, total provision will increase. Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian
(1986) provide an elegant proof of this proposition, but the eﬀect is intuitive
enough to explain informally. Consider taxing a non-giver. This person will not
be able to reduce gi to counteract the increase in ti. As a result, this person’s yi
will be higher. This means that for all givers, Y−i will be higher and, as a result,
their “social income” will also be higher. Since Y is a normal good, each will
demand more of it, and so the new equilibrium Y will be higher than before the
tax.
These two results of complete crowding but also non-neutral taxation on non-
givers can explain a lot about what we see in the real world data. However, further
exploration of these models indicates that there is a lot less predictive power to
these models than may at first appear. This is the topic of the next subsection.
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3.3. Neutrality: Reductio ad Absurdum
A number of articles in the 1980s appeared which explored further implications
of these models, including Sugden (1982), Warr (1983), Bergstrom, Blume, and
Varian (1986), Bernheim (1986), Roberts (1987), Andreoni (1988), and Sandler
and Posnett (1991), bringing to light an elegant model with clear analysis and
stunning results. Unfortunately, many of the results seemed so absurd as to call
into question the basic assumptions of the model and to undermine its usefulness
in understanding philanthropy.
Consider, first, the observation that a large number of individuals give to
a charity. Suppose that the government taxed non-givers by an amount τ and
donated this to the public good. As we saw above, this will increase the total
supply of the public good. But by how much?
Solving for the new equilibrium, each giver will satisfy the equation
G+ τ ≡ fi(mi +G−i + τ).
Implicitly diﬀerentiate with respect to τ to find
dG
dτ
+ 1 = f 0i(
dG−i
dτ
+ 1)
= f 0i(
dG
dτ
− dgi
dτ
+ 1)
This equation can be solved for dgi/dτ. This in turn can be summed across all
givers to find dG/dτ. Doing so, one finds
dG
dτ
=
−
Pk
i=1
1−f 0i
f 0i
1 +
Pk
i=1
1−f 0i
f 0i
> −1.
This is as predicted by the theory of the last subsection. However, divide the
numerator and denominator by k, the number of givers, and let k increase to
infinity. Combine this with the assumption that 0 < f 0i ≤ θ < 1, and it follows
immediately that
lim
k→∞
dG
dτ
= −1.
Hence, when the number of givers is large, even non-neutral taxes become ap-
proximately neutral.12
12This result was motivated by Sugden (1982) and derived by Andreoni (1988).
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Another result from large economies is that as n increases, the proportion of
the population giving shrinks to zero. This can be seen most easily by assuming
identical preferences but diﬀerent incomes. Imagine a probability distribution
function for incomes from which the population of potential givers is drawn. Then
for any population of n and equilibrium G, all givers will satisfy
G = f(mi +G−i).
Invert f to get
f−1(G) = mi +G−i
= mi +G− gi
Rearrange to get
gi = mi − f−1(G) +G
= mi −m∗(G).
This expression reveals that for each G there is a critical level of income, m∗,
such that only those with incomes greater than m∗ will be giving. Since m∗(G) ≡
f−1(G) − G, it follows from normal goods that dm∗(G)/dG > 0. The question
then is, how does m∗ change as population changes?
Formal demonstration of this can be found in Andreoni (1988), but again we
provide the intuition here. Let’s draw another member of the economy from the
probability density function of income. If we draw an m < m∗, then this has
no eﬀect on G but increases the proportion of non-givers. Suppose we draw an
m > m∗. Then this person will be a giver. Can total giving then decline? A simple
revealed preference argument (Andreoni and McGuire, 1993) shows it cannot–if
more givers end up giving less in total, then the original set of givers could have
increased utility by giving less in the first place. Hence, total giving will rise, and
so m∗ will rise, which also means that a smaller fraction of the population will
have m > m∗ and so a smaller fraction will be giving. As n rises to infinity, one
can show that only the richest sliver of the economy will be givers. Moreover, the
result is robust to heterogeneity of types.
Another set of elegant yet unexpected findings come from extensions of the
crowding out result to neutrality of income redistribution. Warr (1983) and
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) show that small redistributions of income
among givers have no eﬀect on either the total supply of public good, or on in-
dividual consumption. The fact that people give to a common public good will
undo the eﬀect of the redistribution.
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A simple way to see this result is by sequential application of the crowding out
proposition proved in the prior subsection. First take money t ≤ gi from giver
i and donate this to the public good. This will be neutral. Next take t from the
public good and give it to giver j. This just runs the crowding out proposition in
reverse, so it too will be neutral. But notice what we have done–we’ve taken t
from giver i and transferred it to giver j. Because both i and j are giving to the
same public good, the redistribution of income is neutral. No consumption has
been aﬀected.
Bernheim (1986) showed how this eﬀect extends to the case of multiple public
goods. What if person i and j in this example are giving to diﬀerent public goods?
Person i gives to good A and person j gives to good B. Then certainly this income
transfer will not be neutral, right? Maybe not. Suppose there is a person k who
gives to both A and B, and that gBk > t. Then the transfer of t from i to j can be
constructed by first transferring t from i to k, then transferring again from k to
j. Both of these are neutral so the transfer from i to j is neutral too. Of course,
we don’t need to stop here. If there are many public goods and a chain of neutral
transfers between pairs of agents that can reconstruct a given redistribution, then
the redistribution itself will be neutral. The greater the number of public goods,
the greater the chance that any redistribution will be neutral.13 Hence, not only
will the government be helpless to aﬀect the amount of public goods provided,
but helpless to aﬀect the distribution of income.
Bernheim (1986) and Andreoni (1988) found circumstances under which neu-
trality also extends to subsidies to giving, that is, even distortionary taxes can be
neutral. Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996), however, showed that neutrality does
not extend to all distortionary taxes. The key to whether subsidies are neutral
rests on how the government chooses to make credible its promise to balance the
budget, even outside of equilibrium. If, for instance, the government moves last,
after individual gifts are made, and adjusts government donations or individual
taxes to keep the budget in balance, then subsidies simply act like elaborate redis-
tributions of income and, appealing to earlier results, have a neutral eﬀect. If the
government moves first, however, and oﬀers a credible tax and subsidy scheme
that balances the budget even outside of the equilibrium, the subsidies can be
eﬀective.14
13Berhneim and Bagwell (1988) have a related finding with respect to redistributions across
generations, where transfers between families are neutralized. They draw a similar conclusion
that the strength of neutrality leads to absurd conclusions.
14Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996) showed that any model of subsidies must also make a
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Most readers would agree that the results reported in this subsection cast
those of the prior subsection in a diﬀerent light. If we are going to accept complete
crowding out, we also need to believe in near complete crowding of any government
gifts to charity, that only the very richest are giving, that redistributions of income
are neutral as long as people are giving to charities, and that even “distortionary”
taxes may be non-distortionary. Few people, I expect, are willing to adopt the
full slate of predictions from a model of pure public goods–a classic reductio ad
absurdum. How, then, can we modify the model of charitable giving to get a more
realistic picture of giving to public goods?
3.4. Warm-Glow Giving
The model of pure public goods is an extremely natural model to turn to, so
what made it such a poor predictor? Certainly the goods people are giving to are
pure public goods, and certainly people have feelings of altruism that make them
demand these goods. So what needs to change to make the model more realistic
and more predictive?
All of the results presented in the last section rely on one feature of the pure
public goods model: all else equal, individuals are assumed to be indiﬀerent be-
tween all the sources of the contributions to the charity, are indiﬀerent to the
means by which the good is provided, and only care for the total supply of the
public good. Simple introspection (an often dangerous avenue to take) reveals that
there are many other considerations to giving that may make people not indiﬀer-
ent to the means of providing the good. As stated in the introduction, humans are
moral–they enjoy doing what is right. They are also emotional, empathic and
sympathetic–they enjoy gratitude and recognition, they enjoy making someone
else happy, and they feel relieved from guilt when they become a giver. Put more
simply and more generally, people may experience a “warm-glow” from giving.
credible plan for balancing the government’s budget (a subtlety not recognized by Warr, 1982,
and Roberts, 1987). That is, even if the tax and subsidy scheme will balance the budget in
equilibrium, explicit and credible plans for balancing the budget even in non-equilibrium choices
must also be made. If, for instance, the government is left to be the residual claimant, that is,
any imbalance in the government’s budget must be made up in further taxation on individuals or
reduction in government contributions to the public good, then subsidies become an incredible
method for increasing giving–they amount to elaborate and neutral redistributions of income.
However, if the government makes other citizens the residual claimants by, for instance, setting
taxes ti = sG−i/(n− 1) where s is the subsidy rate, then taxes can increase giving. This holds
even if non-givers are taxed. Related results are found in Boadway, Pestieau, and Wildasin
(1989).
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All of these moral compunctions and emotional exchanges mean that people are
not indiﬀerent to their own voluntary gift and the gifts of others. They strictly
prefer, all else equal, that the gifts come from themselves.
A simple model that could capture these eﬀects would be to put an individual’s
contribution in the utility function directly: ui = ui(xi, G, gi). This means that
donations will have some qualities of public goods, but also some properties of
private goods. A similar model, first suggested in a footnote by Becker (1974),
has been developed and analyzed by Cornes and Sandler (1984), Steinberg (1987),
and Andreoni (1989, 1990).15 Because this model contrasts with the case where
giving is motivated only by a concern, perhaps altruistically, for the public good,
the model with warm-glow is also sometimes referred to as impure altruism. More
commonly, however, the model is simply referred to as one of warm-glow giving.16
How will the model of warm-glow giving aﬀect predictions of crowding out?
Write the individual’s optimization problem this way, assuming the inequality
constraint is not binding:
max
x,g
ui(xi, G, gi)
s.t. xi + gi = mi
As above, rewrite this problem so that the person is choosing G rather than gi :
max
xi,G
u(xi, G,G−G−i)
s.t. xi +G = mi +G−i
Again, the solution to this will be a supply of gifts function that depends on social
income, but also will have a separate argument for G−i, resulting from the new
15Note that the warm-glow model u(xi,G, gi) is diﬀerent from a model that assumes
u(xi, G−i, gi), as was suggested by Becker (1974). By including gi in two arguments, the warm-
glow model can take advantage of added convexity in proving theoretical results, and can also
contain two polar cases of pure altruism, u(xi, G), and pure warm-glow (or egoism), u(xi, gi).
16Charlie Clotfelter once mentioned to me, informally, that the term “warm-glow” is somewhat
pejorative, but that the tone it projects is right on the mark. First, the hint of sarcasm keeps
us constantly reminded of the Stigler and Becker (1977) “De Gustibus” critique–the economic
theorist cannot casually assume in preferences that the people behave as they do simply because
they want to. Nonetheless, the fact that people do get a joy from giving is such a natural
observation as to be nearly beyond question. Hence, the playfulness of the “warm-glow” phrase
conveys the sense of “but of course, isn’t it obvious?” Both aspects of the subtext here are
important: when the simplest model doesn’t work, turn to introspection–but do so carefully.
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third argument of the utility function:
gi = fi(mi +G−i, G−i)−G−i.
Let f si be the derivative with respect to social income, and let f
w
i be the derivative
with respect to the second term, which is the warm-glow term. Normal goods
assures us that 0 < f si < 1, and as shown in Andreoni (1989, 1990), the warm-
glow term is positive, fwi > 0. Take the derivative of this function with respect
to G−i to get
dgi
dG−i
= f si + f
w
i − 1
= −(1− f si ) + fwi .
This derivative reveals the primary diﬀerence between purely altruistic and warm-
glow models of giving. With no warm-glow, increased giving by others causes
people to reduce their gifts, because others’ gifts are a perfect substitute for one’s
own. This is captured in the −(1 − f si ) part of the expression above. However,
with warm-glow the others’ gifts are imperfect substitutes for one’s own. Hence,
with warm-glow a person is no longer as willing to reduce his own contribution
in response to increased gifts by others. This is captured in the fwi part. Hence,
warm-glow creates a “stickiness” to giving–people are no longer indiﬀerent to
the source of the gift. At the extreme where people care only for warm-glow, then
dgi/dG−i = 0 and so f si + f
w
i = 1
This will, obviously, imply that crowding out will no longer be complete. But
this is true only so long as warm-glow does not extend to gifts made involuntarily
through taxes.17 To see this, write the utility function u(xi, G + t, gi).Assume
that only person i is taxed. Following the steps above we get a supply function
gi = fi(mi+G−i, G−i+t)−(G−i+t). It is easy to see that dgi/dt = fwi −1. If there
is no warm-glow then fwi = 0 and dgi/dt = −1, which is complete crowding out.
However, when fwi > 0, then −1 < dgi/dt which means person i will not reduce
gi enough to restore the prior equilibrium and crowding out will be incomplete.
Formally, assume only person 1 is taxed. Then totally diﬀerentiate the demand
equation to get
dg1 = f
s
1dG−1 + f
w
1 (dG−1 + dt)− (dG−1 + dt)
17For instance, if utility were u(xi, G+ T, gi + ti) then small taxes will again be neutral.
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Also totally diﬀerentiate the other n− 1 equations. For each equation, substitute
dG−i = dG− dgi. Add these n equations and solve for dG/dt to get
dG
dt
= c
fw1
fs1 + f
w
1
− 1
= cω1 − 1
where c > 0 is a function of all n responses.18 The coeﬃcient ω1 = fw1 /(f s1 + fw1 )
can be interpreted as the relative strength of the warm-glow motive for person 1.
The stronger the warm-glow motive relative to the altruism motive, that is the
bigger is ω1, the lower crowding out will be. If there is no warm-glow motive for
person 1, then fw1 = 0, so ω1 = 0, and again crowding out is complete.19
Similar results hold with respect to transfers of income. Imagine taking money
from person 1 and giving it to person 2. We can construct this transfer as a
simultaneous tax increase on person 1 and tax decrease on person 2. Letting
dt1 = dt = −dt2 then we can repeat the steps above and solve to find
dG
dt
=
dG
dt1
− dG
dt2
= c(ω1 − ω2).
If ω1 > ω2, so that the warm-glow motive of the person losing income is relatively
stronger than that of the person receiving income, then the level of the public
good will rise.20 Intuitively, warm-glow makes people’s giving “sticky” and a
poor substitute for another’s giving. Thus, reducing income of the less responsive
person will have the least eﬀect on G.
We now see that the simple generalization to warm-glow preferences means
that neutrality goes away. Moreover, we see that pure altruism–the absence of
a warm-glow motive–is both necessary and suﬃcient for neutrality, and thus an
extremely special case.
Putting warm-glow into the model is, while intuitively appealing, an admit-
tedly ad hoc fix. Hence, it is important to find real evidence that warm-glow is
18In particular, c = [1 −
Pn
i=1(1 + f
s
i − fwi )/(fsi + fwi )]−1. See Andreoni (1989) for a more
detailed derivation.
19See Andreoni (1989) for formal proof. Note that this discussion diﬀers subtly from Andreoni
(1989, 1990), who described 1− ω as an “altruism coeﬃcient,” rather than ω as a “warm-glow
coeﬃcient.”
20Notice that the transfer will have a neutral aﬀect on G if whenever ω1 = ω2. However, the
eﬀect on all consumption, including x’s will only be neutral if ω1 = ω2 = 0. See Andreoni (1989)
for details.
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an important feature of preferences. Using survey data on giving, this would be
a nearly impossible task. We could only indirectly test the hypothesis by finding
choices consistent with predictions of the model (see Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002).
However, using controlled laboratory experiments we can more accurately iden-
tify whether preferences include a warm-glow term. Fortunately, the experimental
data is overwhelming in its support of warm-glow. Most notably, Andreoni (1993,
1995), Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996, 1997), and Andreoni and Miller (2002) find
clear evidence of well-behaved preferences for giving that include a warm-glow
motive. These provide the needed evidence to turn this ad hoc fix into a solid
foundation of human motivation.
3.5. The Dominance of Warm-Glow
Suppose both motives of altruism and warm-glow exist. One can show that as the
economy grows large, warm-glow will become the dominant if not the exclusive
motive for giving at the margin. While general arguments exist, perhaps it is
most expedient to use a special example to motivate the result.21
Suppose the economy has n individuals with identical incomesm and identical
Cobb Douglas preferences
ui = lnxi + α lnG+ β ln gi.
The first order conditions are then
− 1
m− gi
+ α
1
G
+ β
1
gi
= 0.
Since individuals are identical, the Nash equilibrium gifts will be the same for all
i, thus G∗ = ng∗. Substitute this into the above and find the Nash equilibrium
contribution to be
g∗ =
αm/n+ βm
1 + α/n+ β
(3.5)
Note that if there were only altruism and no warm glow, then g∗ = αm/(n+α).
In this case, as n increases, each person’s equilibrium gift asymptotes to zero
(while total giving asymptotes to αm). By contrast, if there were no altruism
and only warm-glow, then g∗ = βm/(1 + β),which is independent of n. Now look
21See Ribar and Wilhelm (2002).
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again at (3.5). As n increases, the relative importance of α, the utility parameter
on altruism, diminishes and, in the limit, choices are dictated solely by β, the
warm-glow parameter. With this, all the implications of neutrality disappear–in
the limit giving is a solely private good.22
Another way to see this intuitively is that, as the size of the charity grows, all
giving due to altruism will be crowded out, leaving only giving due to warm-glow.
This accords naturally with the observation that giving $100 to an organization
that collects millions is motivated more by an admiration for the organization
than for any measurable eﬀect of the marginal donation. That does not, however,
imply that altruism is not important–the two are surely tied together. Just like
hunger tells a person it is time to eat but taste buds tells the person what they
want to eat, it is altruism that should tell you what to give to, but warm-glow
tells you how much to give.
4. Should Warm-Glow Count in Social Welfare?
Now that we have explored the implications of the warm-glow assumption, demon-
strated its importance, and verified the assumption on empirical grounds, we are
faced with a deep and significant question: How should warm-glow giving factor
into calculations of social welfare?23
This is as much a philosophical question as it is an economic one. Reason-
able people will likely diﬀer on the answer. On one hand, we should not question
preferences. On the other hand, however, we can easily imagine cases where a (pa-
ternalistic) government would improve well-being by ignoring those preferences.
Perhaps the best way to understand this question is through a series of examples
and analogies.
Consider an example of time preferences and savings. Madrian and Shea
(2001) have recently shown that if new employees are automatically entered into
22Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) show that for general preferences, the suﬃcient condition for
this to be met is that the marginal rate of substitution between warm-glow and consumption,
evaluated at g = 0, not vanish as n grows.
23Diamond (2003) provides a related discussion, which also inspired some of the points pro-
vided below. For a contrasting view, see Kaplow (1995, 1998) who treats gifts and warm-glow
as in the realm of social welfare maximization. Thus, he argues that those who are loved more
by others are also loved more by the government. He also argues that the government should
subsidize gifts, and those who enjoy giving more should get greater subsidies. While, in princi-
ple, these arguments are defensible, I argue here that under greater scrutiny, their application
becomes unclear.
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a 401(k) retirement savings plan (unless they opt out), far more of them enroll
than when they are not automatically entered (and must opt in). All that diﬀers
between these two situations is the institution within which people make their
savings decision. If we believe that people are revealing what is in their own
best interest, then which situation is revealing the true preferences? If a social
planner, with the objective to maximize social welfare, choose which institution
it wanted for society, which would it choose and how would it frame the choice?
Most economists would, I suspect, say that the two institutions simply provide
diﬀerent frames for the decision and that these frames may bias or distort be-
havior, preying perhaps on people’s incomplete information or financial naivete,
and that social welfare calculations about the optimal level of savings should be
independent of these biases or frames and should assume complete information
and sophisticated choices. But, conceding to these biases, frames, and naivete,
economists would choose the institution that resulted in behavior closest to that
selected in a hypothetical “clean” environment of no biases, no frames, and perfect
information.
Next, consider a laboratory experiment to provide public goods (see Andreoni,
1995). In this experiment, the exact same game is presented in two frames, one
positive and one negative. In the positive frame subjects are given 100 units of
money to keep, but are told they can contribute any share of it to a public good,
thus creating a positive externality for other subjects. In the negative frame they
are told that all the money is already given to the public good, but that they
can withdraw up to 100 units to keep, thus creating a negative externality. What
happens? People don’t seem to be bothered that much by creating a negative
externality, although they don’t like the “cold-prickle” they feel, but really enjoy
the warm glow of creating positive externalities. Does this mean it is socially
preferred to provide more of the public good when giving donations creates a
warm-glow than in the world where withdrawing donations creates a cold-prickle?
What is happening in this game is that there is utility from the act of making the
choice, and this “choice utility” is again biasing choices. Since the only diﬀerence
in these worlds is the frame which prejudices the decisions–whether the economy
is endowed with money in the public good (like a commons) or in the private good
(as with charitable giving)– it seems that we would want a social criterion that
would give us the same directive in both cases.
What about this hypothetical situation: Imagine two pairs of friends. Each
pair meets every week for lunch at the same restaurant and always orders the
same thing. Al and Andy each pay for their own meals, while Bob and Brad take
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turns picking up the tab. The B friends get a warm-glow from giving a gift to
each other each week. Can we say they are better oﬀ than the A friends? Maybe,
but maybe not. Bob and Brad are constantly in a state of having to retire a debt.
So, while buying lunch for the friend is improving utility, it may be the debt they
are paying oﬀ has lowered their utility in the first place. Hence, it is just as likely
that the mutual gift-giving friends are actually worse oﬀ than the self-suﬃcient
friends. As economists, we have no way of knowing.
Next, a related point on the “power of the ask.” Fund-raisers know that to get
money donated, you have to ask for it. And, most often you either get nothing
or you get the amount you asked for. Think of how you feel when colleagues asks
you to give to a cause, buy girl scout cookies, or sponsor their kids’ sports teams.
Although you cringe when they approach, you give because saying no would be
even more painful than saying yes. Hence, giving has a marginally positive eﬀect
on your utility–but it was “the ask” that lowered it in the first place. By provid-
ing public goods through charities, we are creating obligations, guilt, and social
pressure among people that they relieve by giving to charity. The giving creates
warm feelings, provides social praise, and may actually build valuable relation-
ships. But even with successful charitable fund-raising, do the positive feelings
of giving outweigh the negative feelings of the burdens of obligation and guilt?
Again, we have no way of knowing.
Finally, consider this experimental data collected by Kahneman and Knetsch
(1991). They ask people a series of questions about how much they are willing
to contribute to a public good. Each successive question they ask involves a
environmental public good that embeds the public good in the prior question–
environmental clean up on a local level versus regional level versus national level.
Thus, stating a smaller number when moving to a larger scale would be logically
inconsistent. What they find is that the answer to the first question they ask is,
on average, about $25, and the answer to the second is about $50. But this is true
whether the first question is about the local, regional or national good. Hence,
the good itself seems not to matter for the willingness to pay. Kahneman and
Knetsch instead argue that the answers to these questions are simply maintaining
a self-image of being an environmentalist. What if the warm glow of giving to a
public good is exactly the same as this? When a fund-raiser calls and asks for
a donation, the gift is simply buying a self-image that says “I am a decent and
generous person,” or perhaps less positively, “I am not cold-hearted and selfish.”
This is a demand that, as in Say’s law, would not have been generated had the
supply of fund-raisers for charitable causes not emerged in the first place. So,
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whether and how this “spin oﬀ” good should be counted in social welfare will
depend on whether the social planner has any direct interest in creating this
market in the first place. That is, does society have a direct interest in creating
a market for maintaining self-images? Lacking any argument that it does, then
the creation of this market should not in itself aﬀect the social welfare goals of
proving the eﬃcient level of charity.
These examples have illustrated four principles that militate against counting
warm-glow in welfare:
1. Choices in the real world are distorted by the institutions within which
they are made. These biases prey on decision frames, incomplete information,
and naive decision makers. Optimal social policy should have as a goal decisions
that would be made in an idealized world where there are no decision frames, no
missing information or knowledge, and no social distortions.
2. Diﬀerent institutions for providing public goods bring up diﬀerent emotions
or sentiments simply by creating diﬀerent environmental cues. Even small or
seemingly innocuous changes may have big eﬀects on behavior. This “decision
utility” does not itself represent any new consumption, but only utility gained by
the process of generating consumption.24 While such decision utility may aﬀect
society’s choice of institution to reach social goals, the determination of these
social goals, that is the social welfare calculations, should be independent of such
decision utility.
3. Even if we were to include warm-glow, we are not sure whether it should
increase or decrease welfare. If giving to charity is relieving a guilty feeling, then
although it certainly increases utility to give, it does not necessarily mean utility
is higher than it would be if the government had forced the contribution through
taxation.
4. What if warm-glow giving is purchasing some other good that, while related,
is totally separate from the charity itself, such as maintaining a self-image. What
is society’s interest in creating this spin-oﬀ good? If there is no compelling social
interest in creating this good, it seems like its existence should have no eﬀect on
the calculation of the socially optimal level of the public good itself.
These four points present a (partial) list of the reasons why counting warm-
glow in social welfare calculations is either problematic or potentially misleading.
In my own view, it is most prudent and most informative to first recognize that
behavior is chosen by people seeking warm-glows, but then to set the social welfare
maximizing goals that makes no adjustment for warm-glow in aggregating welfare.
24The term “decision utility” is taken from Diamond (2003).
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That is, all social welfare prescriptions should be made without counting warm-
glow, but should be constrained by behavior that is dictated by seeking warm-
glow.25
Why is this important? When choosing government policy that aﬀects giving,
it is essential to know what our government’s objective should be. We next explore
an example of this in describing the optimal tax treatment of giving.
5. Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable Giving
In the US and many other countries, there is a tax preference for giving to charity.
This eﬀectively reduces the price of giving. In the US, for instance, charitable
giving can be deducted from taxable income, making the price inversely related
to the marginal tax rate. With progressive rates, this means those with higher
incomes get higher marginal subsidies. This section explores the question, can
this subsidy be justified within the context of an optimal tax framework?
This question has been in the literature for a long time. Feldstein (1980)
produced the first serious work on it, followed by Boadway and Keen (1993) and
Kaplow (1996). A recent paper by Diamond (2006) (see also Saez , 2004), however,
has made significant progress on advancing this question. Here we present a
simplified version of Diamond’s model.
Imagine a world with two types of people, high skilled, H, and low skilled, L.
The problem for optimal income taxation is to get the types to self-select into jobs
and wages that separate the types and allow the social planner to implement a
progressive tax system. The binding constraint, however, is that the high skilled
must be better oﬀ revealing themselves to be of the high-skilled type. That this
constraint is binding makes the tax system second-best (see Stiglitz 1982, for the
origins of this literature).
Suppose we add to this system a set of subsidies to giving to a public good.
The intuition of Diamond is that this adds a second dimension on which to sort
individuals. Suppose, for instance, that we gave a bigger subsidy to the high
skilled type than the low skilled type. If a high skilled person pooled with the
lower skilled, then not only would the person get less consumption, but would also
25Note that this is not a non-welfarist argument. I am not arguing that something other than
utility should matter, I am arguing that the definition of utility can be compromised for social
welfare calculations. Hence the critique of Kaplow and Shavell (2001) does not quite apply. For
instance, we should not think that a murder was less important because a murderer enjoyed the
act of killing. Rather, we would choose to ignore this in calculating the social cost of murder.
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get a lower subsidy to giving and, as a result, less of the public good. This makes
sorting to the right type even more attractive. This then relaxes the self-selection
constraint, which allows the government to engage in more welfare-enhancing
redistribution. Hence, moving to a situation of all-government provision to one of
subsidized giving can improve welfare by relaxing the self-selection constraint on
the high skilled types.
More formally, suppose individuals have warm-glow preferences U = u(xi) +
α + v(G) + w(gi), where u(), v() and w() are all continuous, diﬀerentiable and
concave, and α is the utility of labor. Let αij be the utility of a person of type i
working in a job of skill j. We assume that a low skilled person can only work in
a low skilled job, so normalize αLL = 0. Then we assume that αHL > αHH , that
is, a high skilled person gets less disutility from working in the low skilled job.
Let mH and mL be the production from high and low skilled jobs, and let NH and
NL be the number of each in the economy.
Following the arguments of the prior section, we assume that choices are dic-
tated by warm-glow preferences, but social welfare prescriptions are made without
counting warm-glow.26 Let pi be the price of giving faced by type i.Then define
c∗i and g
∗
i as the solution to the individual first order conditions:
v0(
P
g∗j ) + w
0(g∗i )
u0(c∗i )
= pi. (5.1)
Equation (5.1) implicitly defines g∗i = g(c
∗
i ). Then the social welfare optimization
problem becomes
max
c,G
NH [u(cH) + αHH + v(G)] +NL[u(cL) + v(G)]
subject to:
E +G+NHcH +NLcL = NHmH +NLmL (5.2)
u(cH) + αHH + v(G) + w(gH) ≥ u(cL) + αHL + v(G− gH + gL) + w(gL)(5.3)
G ≥ NHgH +NLgL (5.4)
gi = g(ci), i = H,L. (5.5)
26Diamond (2006) has explicit derivations for the general case of many types, with and without
warm-glow preferences, and with and without counting warm-glow in welfare. As noted above,
Diamond argues that warm-glow preferences and no-warm-glow social welfare maximization are
the appropriate assumptions.
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The first constraint (5.2) is the resource constraint of society, where E is the
government expenditures other than on the public good. For simplicity, we have
normalized the cost of G to be 1. The second constraint (5.3) is the self-selection
constraint. This requires that the subsidy scheme is one in which the high skilled
individual chooses not to act as if he were a low skilled type. Constraint (5.4)
defines G in terms of private and government gifts. The inequality indicates that
the government may also give directly to the public good, so private contributions
are a lower bound on G. The final constraint (5.5) specifies the relationship
between ci and gi that is derived from the individuals’ first order conditions (5.1).
It’s this relation between (5.1) and (5.5) that specifies the implied subsidy to
giving for each income class.
Diamond shows that, in principle, there could be two solutions to this problem,
one in which the self-selection constraint binds and one in which it does not. The
more interesting one is when it binds. In this case, the solution is that cH ≥ cL,
and gH > gL
To see how the eﬀect works, reserve some money from the economy to pay
for G at the optimal second-best level (so we think of the problem as allocating
consumption c). Then imagine the above problem with no utility for public goods,
that is, without v() or w(). Then the self-selection constraint would require cH >
cL in order to induce the high skilled to accept the more arduous job. Next add
in the public good and the utility v(). Now the second-best cH and cL we found
without the public good utility will leave the self-selection constraint slack, with
the left-hand side strictly larger. Hence, the government can reduce cH and raise
cL if this redistribution will improve social welfare. Finally, add in the warm-glow
term, w(). This will make the self-selection constraint slack again, so even more
redistribution is possible. How do we lower cH and raise cL in each step? By
lowering the pH relative to pL, that is by subsidizing the gifts of the wealthy by
more than the gifts of the poor.
Diamond shows, therefore, that a subsidy system like that inherent in the US
tax code could be optimal. That is, an increasing marginal income tax rate that
redistributes consumption, combined with a subsidy rate on giving (one minus
the marginal tax rate) that rises with income could be about right.27
27Scharf (2000) oﬀers another explanation that is rooted in some of the same incentives for
redistribution. She asks why majority voting would lead to a system with subsidies to giving.
She shows that the median voter can use giving subsidies to favorably aﬀect the distribution
of income, thus leading to welfare improvements over total government provision of the public
good.
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This then leads to a fascinating yet complex question: What happens to the
second-best level of G–is it higher or lower than the first best level? The answer,
it turns out, is unclear. In the case of Diamond’s model, it will depend on the
shape of the various components of the utility functions. It is possible that Gmay
be either higher or lower than in the first-best case. But a deeper answer to
this puzzle can be seen in relation to a parallel literature on optimal second-best
level of public goods when they are provided entirely by the government, not via
subsidies to private giving.
Recall the familiar Samuelson conditions for the first-best eﬃcient level of
public goods provision: the sum of the marginal rates of substitution equal to the
marginal cost of the public good. When moving to a second-best world, obviously,
this equation must be modified. It was first noted by Pigou (1947) that if we must
raise distortionary taxes to cover the cost of this good, then these distortionary
taxes are themselves adding to the cost side of this equation. As a result, the
second-best level of the public good must be lower than the first-best level.
As with so much of second-best taxation, it’s not that simple. Atkinson and
Stern (1974) noted that whether the second-best G is above or below the first-
best will depend on how the public good aﬀects the marginal excess burden of
the taxed goods. For instance, suppose that the public good reduces the elasticity
of demand for a taxed good. Providing public broadcasting, for instance, may
reduce the elasticity of demand for televisions. In this case increasing G can, at
the margin, reduce deadweight loss. If the gain is big enough, the second-best G
may exceed the first-best.28
6. Gifts of Cash: Price and Income Elasticities
As we saw in the last section, there are economic rationales for providing a tax-
subsidy for charitable giving. Indeed, a tax exclusion for giving is part of the US
tax system, and of other tax systems around the globe. In the US the present
day income tax was first established by the 1913 Revenue Act, after the 16th
amendment to the US Constitution ensured its legality earlier that same year.
Just a few years later, the Revenue Act of 1917 was passed. Its main purpose
28Thomas Gaube (2000) provides a modern theoretical examination of this. Pigou’s conjecture
is correct if all goods are normal, and if all private goods are gross substitutes. Without this,
counterexamples to Pigou’s conjecture can be found. For a related literature on contributing
to “public bads” of pollution, see the debate on the “double dividend,” such as Cremer and
Gahvari (2001) or Fullerton and Metcalf (2001).
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was to broaden the tax base in order to raise funds for World War I, but it also
introduced the deduction for charitable giving. It has been part of the tax code
ever since.
The importance for policy makers of the charitable deduction is first that it
reduces tax revenues–a so-called tax expenditure. This is one cost of the program.
The benefit is that it also reduces the cost of giving and thus may encourage more
of it. Let t be the marginal tax rate faced by an individual. A gift of g which is
deductible from taxable income will reduce taxes owed by tg. Hence, the eﬀective
price of a dollar of giving is 1− t.
A question policy makers have often raised is whether the cost, measured in
foregone tax revenues, is less than the benefit, measured by increased dollars of
giving. The answer will be yes if the price elasticity of giving, ε, is less than
negative one, that is, if giving is price elastic.29 It is also true that at ε =
−1 the policy will be revenue neutral. Hence, searching for ε < −1has been the
“gold-standard” for some policy analysis. But is this the appropriate benefit-cost
measure? What is the appropriate counterfactual in measuring the cost? If it
is that these tax dollars could be applied directly to the charity, then foregone
tax revenue is an accurate cost measure only if there is no crowding out of the
government grant to charity. If there is crowding out, then it is possible that
a subsidy could still be more eﬀective at raising charity dollars even when the
price elasticity is greater than negative one. Moreover, this sum must be deflated
to account for the distortionary cost of collecting taxes. On the benefit side,
measuring the benefit by simply the dollars donated is also incomplete. The
fact that gifts create externalities means measuring benefits this way is likely to
understate the benefits. Both the cost and benefit side ignore the institutional
responses by fund-raisers. The “gold-standard,” therefore, is only an imperfect
criterion of the policy evaluation.
This section will provide a brief review of the most recent and important con-
tributions to measuring price and income elasticities of giving. Over the years
there have been hundreds of studies of these eﬀects. Not surprisingly, these stud-
ies have grown in their sophistication and value over the years. Along the way
29The benefits, g, minus the cost, tg, gives net benefits n(t) = g − tg = (1 − t)g. Then
∂n(t)/∂t > 0 iﬀ
∂g
∂(1− t)
(1− t)
g
= ε < −1.
32
economists have learned many important lessons on measurement and inference
with the charitable deduction. For that reason the next section will provide a
discussion of the issues faced by the econometrician in estimating giving. We
then will oﬀer a brief historical summary of estimates and end with more detailed
discussion of the most promising new developments in the area.
6.1. Econometric Issues in Measuring the Eﬀects of Price and Income
This section explores a number of issues and dilemmas that the econometrician
must face when analyzing the eﬀects of price and income on charitable giving.
The section relies heavily on an excellent discussion by Robert Triest (1998).
Identification Problems. By definition marginal tax rates are a function
of income. This means that the two independent variables are correlated, making
it diﬃcult to identify the eﬀects of either. For instance, suppose income enters
linearly into an estimation equation. Then non-linear relations between price and
income will bias the estimated eﬀects of price. In addition, other conditioning
variables like marital status and numbers of children will also aﬀect both marginal
tax rates and propensities to give, creating an omitted variable bias. This in turn
complicates the identification of the eﬀects of price and income.
What is needed to remedy this problem is variation in price that is indepen-
dent of federal Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) and other conditioning variables.
Feenberg (1987) points out that variation in state tax rates and deductibility rules
can add extra independence. However, adjusting federal tax prices to include any
state tax benefits will only improve identification if there is no systematic or en-
dogenous eﬀect of policies. For instance, states in which people value giving more
may be more likely to have generous subsidies to giving. If this were the case, one
would want to add state fixed eﬀects to control for the heterogeneity. But adding
the fixed eﬀects eliminates the ability to use tax variation as well.
The obvious best solution is to use variation created over a panel, relying on
individual variation in income to identify separate eﬀects. The ideal data would
be a panel that spans a period of tax reform, so that tax rates are also varying
independently in the sample. Barring this, identification of price and income
eﬀects will rest solely on functional form specifications.
Endogenous Marginal Tax Rates. What should we do when an individ-
ual’s contribution reduces their AGI to the point that it pushes them into a lower
tax bracket, thus raising the price of giving? The price of the last dollar given is
the most economically meaningful, but this number is dependant upon the amount
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given. Can we find a suitable instrument for the last-dollar tax price? A common
instrument used in this literature is to use the first-dollar tax price, that is, use
the marginal tax rate that applies to the first dollar donated to charity. This is
uncorrelated with the amount of charity deducted. However, the first-dollar tax
price is still dependent on all other determinants of tax price. If any of these
(omitted) variables are correlated with giving, then even the first-price will not be
an eﬀective instrumental variable. Again, as suggested by Feenberg (1987), state
tax variation added to the federal first-dollar price can improve the independence
of the instrument. Alternatively, one could calculate the eﬀective marginal tax
rate at a “predicted” level of giving, where the prediction depends on exogenous
factors.30
Itemizers and Non-Itemizers. For most years under the US tax code,
only filers who itemize their deductions can claim a charitable deduction.31 If
tax returns are the source of data, therefore, only information on givers who
itemize is available. For this reason, studies that rely on tax returns for data
must use only itemizers, and careful studies should use only itemizers who would
have itemized in the absence of the charitable deduction to avoid endogeneity
of the itemization status. Using only itemizers means that only a subset of all
givers are in the sample. This may suggest that surveys rather than income tax
returns are preferred source of data. While surveys allow information on non-
itemizers, they have other serious drawbacks. First, they rely on self-reports
of both giving and income, which may be biased due to faulty memories and by
people overstating both income and contributions. Second, surveys usually do not
include information onmarginal tax rates or on whether individuals itemize. Thus,
the researcher is left to use available information to guess at both itemization
status and marginal tax rates.
After-tax Income. Econometric analysis has often used either AGI or after-
tax income as income measures. Both measures, however, depend on charitable
giving. Hence, before applying these, they should be adjusted to the level they
would be if giving were zero. If gross income is used, obviously, no adjustment
30For instance, Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter (2002) use one percent of income as a predicted
contribution, since this is near the median gift in the sample.
31The term “itemize” refers to a feature of the US tax system. All filers are entitled a deduc-
tion from taxable income equal to the maximum of a “standard deduction” and an “itemized
deduction” which includes charitable giving, among other things. As a result, itemizers tend to
have higher incomes than nonitemizers. For the year 1985 non-itemizers could deduct 50% of
their contributions, and in 1986 they could deduct 100%. This policy was later dropped, leaving
non-itemizers with no charitable deduction.
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need be made. Sensible arguments exist for both measures of income. After-tax
income is a measure of discretionary spending, whereas gross income is broad-
based and independent of tax avoidance decisions.
Appreciated Assets. When giving appreciated assets, there is an extra
tax incentive. Imagine giving a share of stock that was purchased for $20 but is
now valued at $100. The taxpayer can deduct $100 from current taxable income,
avoiding 100t in taxes. In addition they also eliminates any capital gains tax. If
tc is the rate that applies to the capital gain, the taxpayer saves an additional 80tc.
That makes the price of giving equal to 1− t− 0.8tc. More generally, let θ be the
discounted gain-to-value ratio of the asset. Then the price of giving appreciated
property is pa = 1− t− θtc.Unfortunately, data on appreciated property is often
not available, and even when it is the θ is rarely observed. Some authors have
attempted to account for gifts of appreciated property by arbitrarily choosing a
value of θ of, say, 0.5, or by using capital gains tax filings to estimate likely gains.
As seen in the next section on gifts by the wealthy, however, for most samples
that do not include people with high incomes (over, say, $200,000), the value of
appreciated property is less than 20% of all gifts. As incomes rise above this
level, however, appreciated property becomes an increasingly large and dominant
fraction of gifts.
Kinked Budgets. Consider someone who, without charitable giving, is near
the point of being able to itemize deductions. Giving a few dollars extra kicks
them into itemizations status, lowing their price of giving from 1 to 1−t. Crossing
this threshold creates both an income and substitution eﬀect that promotes giving.
Failure to account for this may make giving appear more responsive to price than
it actually is. Over the years, itemization has become increasingly likely, and the
number of diﬀerent marginal tax rates has declined. Hence, the problem of kinked
budgets is less severe than it once was.
Timing of Gifts. Imagine an individual whose income is variable. Her
marginal tax rate varies from year to year as her income changes. Of course, she
anticipates this and smooths her consumption. But it would be optimal to smooth
her charitable giving as well. She should give more in years when her marginal tax
rate is high and less in years when it is low. Similar eﬀects will be seen during a
period of tax reform. If tax rate reductions are expected next year, people should
move some giving forward in order to get a higher tax benefit. This means giving
should spike in the year before tax cuts and drop in years after. Failure to account
for this could dramatically bias estimates.
Household rather than Individual Decisions. Becker’s (1974) famous
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“unitary” model states that as long as household decisions are made by a benev-
olent head, then we can treat demands by households under a neo-classical utility
maximization framework. However, recent work has shown that a household bar-
gaining model–one that cannot be reduced to act a single neo-classical utility
maximizer–is a better description of household decisions. Hence, household vari-
ables matter in how they aﬀect the marital bargain. This means that not simply
household income, but relative incomes of the spouses, may matter. Likewise,
demographics such as age and education of the head may not be enough con-
trols, but relative age and education and the presence of children may aﬀect the
household bargain and thus may all need to be accounted for in the analysis. A
recent paper by Andreoni, Brown and Rischall (2003) confirms this. Men and
women have diﬀerent tastes for giving, and household decisions represent a com-
promise between husband and wife. Men, as it turns out, appear to have most of
the bargaining power. The household choice is closer to men’s preferences than
women’s.
Interdependence of Preferences. We saw in the theoretical section that,
for all intents and purposes, when giving to a large public good individual dona-
tions are dominated by warm-glow at the margin. As such, it is likely to be safe
to ignore the aggregate gifts of others in the regressions–they can be subsumed
into the constant. However, that is not to say that the gifts of others have no
influence. Psychologists and sociologists who have studied giving are convinced
that the actions of others in one’s own environment can also influence one’s acts
of altruism. Giving, for instance, is not like eating–there is no natural measure
of “enough.” Rather, this is determined subjectively as a matter of the “socially
correct” amount to give. Societies or groups of people can determine their own
norms of the expected donations. Hence, the gifts of those of a similar age, ed-
ucation and income can act as a benchmark for one’s own gift. Likewise, the
gifts of others in a work-place charity drive, like the United Way, can also influ-
ence giving, as can solicitations coming from friends rather than strangers. There
are two studies that confirm these eﬀects. Andreoni and Scholz (1998), based
on sociological findings, show that “peer group” eﬀects are significant. Carman
(2003), using a unique data set of work-place contributions, shows that giving by
people one interacts with at work has a positive influence on one’s own giving.
This suggests strategic considerations by fund-raisers to take advantage of these
interdependent preferences, which raises the next issue.
The Interactions with Fund-raising. It seems that almost anyone with
a telephone or mail box has experienced charitable fund-raising. Few of us, I
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suspect, would give in the absence of direct appeals from charitable organizations.
It is likely that these organizations respond to government policy. For instance,
they may increase fund-raising eﬀorts after a reduction in marginal tax rates. This
means that elasticities estimated during a period of stable tax rates may not apply
after a tax reform. In addition to the issues raised under “timing” above, these
responses of fund-raisers are likely to cause long-run elasticities lower than short-
run elasticities as their fund-raising tactics respond to the changing environment
of giving. We discuss fund-raising, both theoretically and empirically in later
sections of this paper.
6.2. A Brief History of Empirical Studies on Charitable Giving
There are several complete and detailed surveys of econometric studies of giving.
These include Clotfelter and Steuerle (1981), Clotfelter (1985, 1990), and Stein-
berg (1990). See also Chapter 4 of this Handbook. Because of limited space, I
refer interested readers to these authors for details. My purpose here is to give a
general flavor of the findings up until 1995.
The first empirical analysis of giving was by Michael Taussig (1967), who
looked at data from 47,000 tax returns in the 1962 Treasury tax file. While the
results of Taussig’s study are not very relevant for today’s economy, he did have
a lasting impact by introducing a staple of the literature: the constant elasticity,
or log-log, specification. Let gi be i’s gifts to charity, yi be income, pi = 1 − ti
be the tax price of giving by person i (as defined above) and Xi be a vector of
demographic variables, such as age, education, marital status, number of children,
and state of residence. Then the log-log specification is
ln gi = α+ β1 ln pi + β2 ln yi +BXi + ²i. (6.1)
This specification is convenient because, corner solutions aside, β1 can be inter-
preted as the price elasticity and β2 as the income elasticity.32
Of course, there are several shortcomings of this framework. First is that many
people give gi = 0, and the log of 0 is undefined. For this reason many researchers
adopt the compromise of adding $10 to both gi and yi and then estimate (6.1) using
OLS. This (approximately) preserves the interpretation of the β’s as elasticities.
Given the censoring of gi at zero, however, it would more appropriate to estimate
(6.1) with Tobit analysis, where ln gi is censored at 1 rather than zero. In this
case, however, the estimated β’s would no longer be directly interpretable as
32To be accurate, Taussig used ti in place of pi in equation (6.1). Others that followed use pi.
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elasticities, because we would have to weight the coeﬃcient by the conditional
probability that gi > 0.
The first important study of this type was by Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976),
who performed OLS on (6.1). Using data from a survey conducted by the Federal
Reserve Board that included both itemizers and non-itemizers, they found price
elasticity of −1.15 and income elasticity of 0.87. Feldstein and Taylor (1976)
conducted a similar study using the 1970 Treasury tax file. Their sample consisted
of 15,000 itemizers. They were also able to account for state tax laws in computing
the tax price of giving. In addition, they made a serious attempt to account for
gifts of appreciated assets. Under several variations of estimates, they found price
elasticities of −1.1 to −1.5 and income elasticities of 0.70 to 0.80. Note that both
of these early studies found price elasticities that exceed the gold-standard of −1.
These two studies are very important in this literature for two reasons. First,
they cast the dye for the log-log analysis and the focus on the gold-standard
elasticity. Second, the massive literature to follow did not do much to change their
estimates. In Coltfelter’s 1985 survey, the consensus was that price elasticities
hovered around −1.3, and income elasticities around 0.7.
By the 1990s, however, this “consensus view” was being challenged. Analysis
using the log-log specification began finding price elasticities spanning an ex-
tremely broad range, falling much higher and lower than −1. Moreover, studies
that used specifications other than log-log were finding consistently smaller price
elasticities.33 At the same time there were several periods of tax reform that pro-
vided the independent variation in price that help identify both price and income
elasticities. With these tax reforms as “natural experiments” and with more so-
phisticated estimation techniques, the consensus view of the eﬀects of government
policy began to erode. In the next two subsections I will review in more detail two
recent contributions to this literature. Each uses the ideal data, that is, panels of
tax returns that straddle periods of tax reforms. However, the two papers come
to strikingly diﬀerent conclusions.
6.3. Randolph’s 1995 JPE Paper
William Randolph (1995) used a panel of US federal tax returns running from
1979—89. This panel followed 12,000 filers and covered a period of two tax reforms.
First was the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) and second was the Tax
33Most notable of these is Reece and Zeischang (1985). This also diﬀered, however, by using
data from the consumer expenditure survey rather than tax returns.
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Reform Act of 1986 (TRA). Each tax reform significantly reduced marginal tax
rates, especially for high income tax payers, and reduced the number of diﬀerent
tax brackets. Randolph’s data over-samples wealthy households and his sample
includes only itemizers.
Randolph had two main objectives in his study. First was using the tax reforms
to strengthen the identification of price and income elasticities of giving. Second
was to address the issue of timing. If in a cross section people are adjusting
the timing of their contributions because of fluctuations in their own marginal
tax rates, this will have the eﬀect of overstating the price elasticities of giving.
The panel nature of his data, combined with the exogenous tax variation, will
help diﬀerentiate between temporary and permanent changes in price, and thus
identify short run and long run elasticities.
To illustrate, consider this two-period model. Let g be gifts and T (y − g) be
the tax schedule, with T 0 > 0, T 00 > 0. Let interest rates be zero, for simplicity.
Then individuals solve
maxU(g1, g2,x1, x2)
s.t. x1 + g1 + x2 + g2 = y1 − T (y1 − g1) + y2 − T (y2 − g2).
Let y∗ be permanent income and yT be transitory income, so yt = y∗+yT , t = 1, 2.
Then note that an increase in y∗ will first have a normal income eﬀect, but will also
lower the price (raise marginal tax rates) in both periods. However, an increase
in transitory income will only lower price in the current period. Given convex
preferences, an increase in yT will have a bigger eﬀect on current giving than a
comparable change in y∗.
Randolph’s empirical model considers the eﬀect of both current and future
prices and income. Let Pit and Yit be current prices and income (at the first price
calculation) and P ∗it and Y
∗
it be expected future prices and income. Randolph
then uses the Almost Ideal Demand System of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) to
estimate this equation:
Pitgit
Yit
= δot + δoi +Xitβ + δ1 log
µ
Pit
P ∗it
¶
+ δ2 logP ∗it
+δ3 log
µ
Yit
Y ∗it
¶
+ δ4 log Y ∗it + δ5
∙
log
µ
Pit
P ∗it
¶¸2
(6.2)
+δ6 logPit · logP ∗it + ²it.
This demand system is an extremely flexible generalization of Cobb-Douglas
demands that allows for non-homothetic preferences and cross-price elasticities
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between current and future consumption. The equation includes fixed eﬀects for
both time, δot, and individuals, δoi, as well as a vector Xit of characteristics,
including age, age squared, and marital status.
Since the econometrician does not observe either permanent or transitory in-
come, or permanent or transitory prices, instruments must be chosen. We need at
least four instruments, two that are correlated with the permanent components
and two with the transitory components.
Define the following: yi is the 10 year average of income, ERTA81 is a dummy
variable equal to 1 for the years between ERTA and TRA, and TRA86 is a dummy
variable for years under the TRA. The instruments for P ∗it and Y
∗
it used by Ran-
dolph are ln(yi), ERTA81 × ln yit, and TRA86 × ln yit. The reasoning is that
the average income is similar to permanent income, and that the tax reforms are
exogenous, hence income in those years will be correlated with permanent income
and price.
The instruments for yTi and p
T
i are (ln yi−ln yit)×ERTA81 and (ln yi−ln yit)×
TRA86. The reasoning here is that deviations from average income in the years
of the tax reform will be somewhat exogenous measures of income shocks.
Table 4
Randalph’s Estimates of Permanant
and Transitory Price and Income Elasticities
Unweighted
Means
Weighted
Means
Income: Permanent, d(Y/Y ∗) = 0 1.30 1.14
(0.02) (0.01)
Transitory, dY ∗ = 0 0.09 0.58
(0.03) (0.01)
Price: Permanent, d(P/P ∗) = 0 −0.08 −0.51
(0.10) (0.06)
Transitory, dP ∗ = 0 −2.27 −1.55
(0.13) (0.06)
Source: Randalph (1995). Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4 shows Randolph’s estimated price and income elasticities (both weighted
and unweighted). As hypothesized, permanent income eﬀects are much stronger
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than transitory changes, and the temporary price elasticities are much stronger
than the permanent elasticities. In fact, the “consensus” elasticities of the prior
literature fall between the permanent and transitory measures of Randolph. This
supports the speculation that the prior literature had both understated income
elasticities and overstated price elasticities. Since, as Randolph notes, “for tax
policy predictions, it is often the permanent behavioral eﬀects that matter most,”
these estimates by Randolph have put the preceding literature into a whole new
light. A similar analysis using panel data, by Barrett, McGuirk, and Steinberg
(1997) found results quite close to Randolph’s. This research seriously undermines
the consensus view on price and income elasticities and, in particular, suggests
that the price elasticity that “matters most” may in fact be far closer to zero than
previously believed.
6.4. Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter’s 2002 AER Paper
Gerald Auten, Holger Sieg, and Charles Clotfelter (2002) tackle the same questions
as Randolph (1995). Their data is basically the same, but spans five more years,
1979-1993, and includes 20,000 filers in an unbalanced panel. The file, again, over-
samples high incomes, while the sample is restricted to those who are itemizers
throughout and those whose marital status does not change over the sample.
Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter’s (ASC’s) approach is vastly diﬀerent from Ran-
dolph’s. Their analysis draws on modern studies of the permanent income hy-
pothesis. Rather than instrumenting for permanent and transitory changes in
income and price, ASC recognize that the stochastic elements of income and price
variation imply restrictions on the covariance matrices of income and price.
They begin with a standard log-log regression equation
ln git = α+ β1 ln pit + β2 ln yit + ui + ²it, (6.3)
where ui is an individual fixed eﬀect. For ease of notation, we drop the i subscripts
and use bold to indicate variables in logs, that is xt = lnxit. Then rewrite (6.3)
as
gt = α+ β1pt + β2yt + u+ ²t.
To control for fixed eﬀects, the authors consider first-diﬀerences, to get the esti-
mation equation
∆gt = β1∆pt + β2∆yt +∆²t. (6.4)
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The task then becomes to separate the permanent and transitory eﬀects of
income and price. Write these this way:
yt = y
p
t + y
t
t
pt = p
p
t + p
t
t.
Starting with y, assume that permanent income follows a random walk, ypt =
ypt−1+ξt, where ξ’s are independently and identically distributed random variables.
Then write the transitory component as ytt = ηt. This means that we can write
∆yt = ξt + ηt − ηt−1. (6.5)
This in turn implies that
var(∆yt,∆yt−s) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
σξ2 + 2ση2 s = 0
−ση2 |s| = 1
0 |s| > 1
. (6.6)
A similar restriction results if we follow these steps again for p.
The authors then parametrize ppt and p
t
t as
ppt = p
p
t−1 + ωt + a1ξt
ptt = ςt + a2ηt,
where the a1 and a2 reflect the fact that variability in income is a cause of vari-
ability in price. This then produces
∆pt = ωt + a1ξt + ςt − ςt−1 + a2(ηt − ηt−1). (6.7)
Combining (6.4), (6.5) and (6.7) we get the ultimate regression equation
∆gt = b1(ωt + a1ξt) + b2(ςt − ςt−1 + a2(ηt − ηt−1))
+b3ξt + b4(ηt − ηt−1) + ψt + ²t − ²t−1.
Estimating this model, and calculating the relevant permanent and temporary
elasticities generates the numbers reported in Table 5. These results stand in stark
contrast to those of Randolph. First, the elasticity of the permanent component is
more elastic in both the price and income terms. This challenges Randolph’s claim
that individuals will respond more aggressively to transitory changes in prices
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than in income. Second, the permanent price elasticity again exceeds the gold-
standard of −1. This challenges Randolph’s second main contention, that cross
sectional studies were seriously overstating price elasticities by merging temporary
and permanent eﬀects. This study indicates that, instead, the consensus view of
a price elasticity of −1.3 is actually quite accurate.
Table 5
Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter’s Estimates
of Permanant and Transitory
Price and Income Elasticities
Unweighted
Means
Income: Permanent 0.87
(0.01)
Transitory 0.29
(0.01)
Price: Permanent −1.26
(0.04)
Transitory −0.40
(0.04)
Source: Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter (2002). Standard
errors in parentheses.
How do we reconcile these two studies? Should we believe price elasticities
are low, as Randolph says, or high, as ASC report? We cannot attribute their
disagreement to diﬀering data–the two data sets are suﬃciently similar that re-
sults are not likely to vary on this account. That leaves two remaining diﬀerences.
First is the estimation method. Randolph uses instruments for permanent and
temporary changes, whereas ASC gain identification through restrictions on the
covariance matrix of price and income. This diﬀerence is not trivial. The second
diﬀerence is the specification of the regression equation. At the heart of the ASC
study is the log-log (or constant elasticity) specification, the same specification
that produced high price elasticities in the prior literature. Randolph uses a flexi-
ble functional form that allows elasticities to vary across price and income. Which
of these two diﬀerences is at the heart of this debate is impossible to tell simply
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by reading the papers. But, with the huge chasm between a price elasticity of
−1.26 and −0.08 to −0.51, and the major policy implications of this diﬀerence, it
seems worthwhile to invite further study on how best to measure these elasticities
of charitable giving.
7. Gifts by the Very Wealthy
Most of the studies reported in the prior section do not include the very wealthy.
However, while the very wealthy are only a small fraction of all givers, when
counted in terms of dollars donated their impact is quite substantial. According
to one study, the richest 400 US tax filers in the year 2000 donated over $10.1
billion to charity, accounting for about 7% of all individual giving in that year.34
Moreover, with the expansion of wealth among the top wealth holders in the US
over the recent decades, their influence is growing.
Despite their importance, there are few studies of giving by the very wealthy.
This is because data is scarce. Because the rich are relatively few in number,
surveys have not attempted to reach them. However, even if they did, concern for
anonymity would likely keep participation low. The best way to get information on
large numbers of wealthy givers is from the IRS, including both income and estate
tax filings. However, the privileged nature of this data restricts its availability,
often limiting it to only select employees of the US Treasury. As a result, we
rely largely on government researchers to produce studies for academic journals.
Fortunately, several such high quality studies exist.
Any discussion of gifts by the wealthy must include a discussion of the estate
tax. In fact, a good de facto definition of “very wealthy” is those individuals whose
heirs could have exposure to the estate tax. Some giving by the wealthy will surely
be motivated by avoiding estate taxes and other taxes that fall predominately on
the wealthy. However, there are other diﬀerences between wealthy givers and
those of more modest means. Among the most important of these is that the
wealthy can and do exert greater control over how their charitable gifts are spent.
For example, large gifts may be rewarded with a seat on the governing board of
a charity, and charities are more likely to tolerate conditions attached to large
gifts. Finally, the very wealthy can often spurn existing charities and create new
charities or foundations to suit their tastes. The explosion of private foundations
in the past decade is a testament to this.
34A report by a foundation called Newtithing calculated this based on data from the Statistics
of Income. See their report at http://www.newtithing.org/content/researchreports_1.html
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In this section we will discuss giving by the very wealthy by first discussing
the diﬀerent tax consequences that these philanthropists face. We then discuss
several studies of giving by the wealthy. Finally, we discuss what impact the
recently legislated phase-out of the estate tax may have on giving by the wealthy.
7.1. Tax Consequences of Gifts by the Wealthy
Compared to those of more modest means, the wealthy in the US face a much
more complex tax code. Income taxes and estate taxes both aﬀect the incentives
to give. Income taxes change the price of giving relative to both consumption
and bequests to one’s heirs. Estate taxes can, of course, only aﬀect the trade-oﬀ
between charitable giving and bequests to one’s heirs. Here we highlight portions
of US tax code which policy analysts will need to account for in determining the
eﬀect of taxes on giving by the very wealthy
Marginal Income Tax Rates. As with other tax-payers, the deductibility
of charitable contributions reduces the price of giving. The rates faced by the
wealthy have varied dramatically since the charitable deduction was introduced
in 1917. Figure 6 shows the changes in the top marginal income tax rate. The
top marginal tax rate reached a high of 90% during that World War II and has
more or less steadily fallen since. In particular the tax reforms of 1981 and 1986
reduced the top marginal rates significantly for wealthy families when they reached
a modern day low of 28%. Tax changes instituted during the first Bush and
Clinton administrations restored somewhat higher rates. However the 2001 tax
cut brought the top rate back down to 33%.
Charitable Deduction Caps. Individuals are not allowed to deduct more
than 50% of their adjusted gross income (AGI) through cash gifts to charities.
Cash gifts to foundations are limited to 30% of AGI. Gifts of appreciated assets–
which would have otherwise been subject to capital gains taxes–are deductible at
their full market value, but only up to 30% of AGI or 20% if the asset is given to
a foundation. In general, tax payers are allowed to carry over contributions made
in excess of these limits for up to five years. It should be noted that wealthy
donors are much more likely to run up against either of these deduction caps
for charitable gifts. However, it is interesting to note that data from Joulfaian
(2000) suggests that wealthy donors on average do not manage to deduct more
than half of their lifetime contributions. It is not clear why this is. Perhaps large
donors don’t really mind “contributing” to the US. government. In any case,
this fact should give pause to any researcher trying to estimate a price elasticity.
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For example, should one use the price of the first dollar given to charity or the
last dollar, since not carrying over the entire amount of a large contribution is
equivalent to paying a marginal price of one?
Figure 6: History of Top Marginal Tax Rates in the US.
Source: US Joint Committee on Taxation, March 6, 2001, JCX-06-01.
Overall Limitation on Itemized Deductions. Besides the caps put on
charitable deductions per se, there is also a limitation on the sum total of all
deductions from taxable income.35 Itemizers in tax year 2000 whose incomes are
greater than roughly $129,000 are required to reduce their total deductions (with
some exceptions which do not include charitable contributions) by the smaller
amount of 80% of their deductions or 3% of their AGI over the threshold amount.
Alternative Minimum Tax. The very wealthy will very likely be subject
to the Alternate Minimum Tax. This is relevant to researchers for two reasons.
First, under the normal way of figuring deductions, gifts of appreciated assets to
charities are deductible at current market value. However, for a period of time
35For more detail, see the US Code Title 26, Section 68.
46
between 1987 and 1993, this was not necessarily the case for people exposed to
the AMT. Second, the top marginal rates are lower under the AMT. Therefore
the price of giving for wealthy people paying the AMT may be higher.
The Estate Tax. Because charitable bequests are deductible from taxable
estates, the estate tax is the second source of subsidy when figuring the price
of giving. An estate tax liability is set when the value of an estate, at death,
exceeds a legislated exemption level. This exemption level was set at $121,000
under the 1976 Tax Reform Act which gave the estate and gift taxes their current
‘unified’ structure. The 1981 ERTA raised the exemption to $225,000. The 1986
TRA raised it to $600,000. The 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act put the exemption on a
schedule of increases toward $1,000,000 by 2006. The 2001 tax cut accelerated the
exemption level increases, as shown in Table 6, culminating in a total repeal by
2010. However, a sunset clause in the law will restore the estate tax to it pre-2001
form for 2011 decedents. Careful estate planners may therefore choose 2010 as
the tax-preferred year to die.
Table 6
Eﬀects of 2001 Changes to the Estate Tax
Taxable Estate
Year of Death Exemption Levels
Before the change $600,000
2003 $1,000,000
2004—2005 $1,500,000
2006-2008 $2,000,000
2009 $3,500,000
2010 no estate tax
2011 and beyond pre-2001 law rules
Currently the top marginal tax rate on estates is 49%, making a $1000 bequest
to charity cost just $510 in one’s heir’s wealth. It is important to keep in mind
that estate tax also lowers the price of giving for contributions made during life.
For example, for an individual in the top income tax and estate tax brackets, the
price of $1000 given to charity while alive is just $340 of heir’s wealth–the gift
first avoids the 0.33 marginal income tax rate and then also the 0.49 marginal
estate tax. An unsettled question in the literature is why, given the added benefit
to one’s heir of giving during life, do we see the wealthy give so much in the form
of bequests.
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Foundations and Trusts. An increasingly popular way for the wealthy to
make charitable gifts is through establishing foundations and trusts. The laws reg-
ulating these are voluminous and complex. Auten et al. (2000) have an excellent
overview of the regulations governing these, which I summarize here.
A foundation is typically set up by an individual or family as an interme-
diary that makes grants to actual operating charities. Gifts to foundations are
deductible from either current income or from the estate. Foundations’ actions are
limited by many regulations. Among the more important ones is that a foundation
must give away a minimum of 5% of its assets each year.36
Besides foundations, the law recognizes several forms of split-interest trusts
which have both charitable and non-charitable beneficiaries. A popular form is
the charitable remainder trust (CRT). A CRT pays its non-charitable beneficiary
either a fixed annuity or a fixed percentage of trust assets. When the trust expires,
the remaining assets are transferred to a charity. The principle tax advantage is
that the donor can deduct from current income the amount eventually to be given
to the charitable organization. The IRS Statistics of Income reports that 85,060
returns were filed by CRTs for the 1998 tax year–a 19% increase over the number
filed in 1996.
7.2. Diﬀerences in Giving Behavior.
Virtually the only source for learning about wealthy givers is tax filings. This
means, however, that information is only available for itemizers. Surprisingly,
not all high income tax payers itemize their returns. Of those earning $50-75,000
in 2000, 62.7% were itemizers. The number climbs to 81.1% for those earning
$75—100,000, but plateaus at 90.5% for those earning from $100,000 up to $5
million. And for those earning over $5 million, only 95.5% are itemizers.37 Thus,
if those who fail to itemize are also making considerable charitable donations, the
inferences from these tax returns may be somewhat biased.
The first question to ask about the wealthy is, are they more or less generous
than middle income tax payers? Table 7 shows that this depends on the measure
36A legislative debate in the US is currently under way about whether this requirement should
be raised. See the “Charitable Giving Act,” H.R. 7 of the 149th Congress. In particular, if the
required distribution rate falls below the growth rate of the assets of the trust, it is possible for
the foundation to exist in perpetuity. Questions have been raised as to whether this is desirable
for either tax or societal reasons.
37These percentages are from the author’s calculations from the IRS Statistics of Income for
2000.
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of overall generosity. The average level of giving as a percent of income is 2.6%
for those making $50,000, rising to 4.0% for those making $2.5 million annually,
indicating that the rich are, on average, more generous. When measured by the
median giver, however, the rich appear less generous. The median $50,000-per-
year-earner gives 1.4% of income, while the median $2.5-million-earner gives only
half as much, 0.7%. What’s behind this switch? The final column of Table 7 gives
an answer–the variance of generosity rises dramatically with income. The 95th
percentile gift is about 8—10% of income for those making less than $1 million,
but for those making over $2.5 in 1995, the 95th percentile gift is almost 21% of
income.
Table 7
Giving as Percent of Income, 1995
Adjusted Gross Income Mean Median 95th Percentile
50K to 100K 2.6 1.4 10.0
100K to 200K 2.4 1.3 8.5
200K to 500K 2.6 1.2 9.0
500K to 1 Million 2.7 1.0 9.7
1M to 2.5 Million 3.2 0.8 14.0
2.5 M and above 4.0 0.7 20.9
Source: Auten, et al. (2000)
One could be tempted to conclude from this that some of the rich are ex-
ceptionally generous, while the majority are extremely selfish. This could be
incorrect, however. The reason is that giving by the wealthy is much more spo-
radic over time. They may give nothing for many years and then make a major
donation all in one year. A sociological study by Schervish and Havens (2003)
indicates that the wealthy are looking for ways to donate money that will have
the greatest impact but will retain some control by the donor. Large gifts made
all at once may make this more likely. Moreover, large one-time gifts are more
frequently rewarded with monuments, such as a name on a campus building, than
are equivalent gifts acclimated over a number of years. Hence, once can speculate
that the rich may be hoarding their money so that, when they do give it away,
they get a greater personal benefit from the act of giving.
Another reason giving by the wealthy may be more sporadic and “lumpy” is
that they are more likely to give gifts in kind, such as appreciated property. For
instance, giving a valuable Picasso painting to a museum is, by necessity, a one-
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time large gift. Giving appreciated stocks may also be lumpy because of market
timing concerns. Table 8 shows that this eﬀect grows rapidly with income.
Table 8
Non-Cash Contributions as a
Percent of Total Contributions, Tax Year 2000.
Adjusted Gross Income Percent Non-Cash
$50,000 to $100,000 17.2
$100,000 to $200,000 21.0
$200,000 to $500,000 25.3
$500,000 to $1,000,000 35.2
$1,000,000 to $1,500,000 42.1
$1,500,000 to $2,000,000 44.8
$2,000,000 to $5,000,000 49.5
$5,000,000 to $10,000,000 57.1
$10,000,000 and above 73.9
Source: Tabulated by Auten, et al. (2000) from IRS Statistics of
Income of Individual Income Tax Return Samples
Despite the clear tax advantage of giving during life, the rich hold a surprising
fraction of giving in their estates. Joulfaian (2001) uses data built from a panel
of income tax returns and subsequent estate tax returns to show this, as seen in
Table 9. The preference for delaying giving until death goes against the grain of
tax incentives. The price of life-time contributions is eﬀectively lower since one
enjoys both an income tax benefit and the same estate tax savings down the road.
Joulfaian speculates that this behavior among the very wealthy may represent
a reluctance to part with wealth during life. Or it could be that the wealthy
consider government to be as good a recipient of their assets as any charity or
heir. In an interesting clue to the psychology of wealth, Avery and Rendall (1993)
claim that inherited wealth is held more dear than earned wealth–they find that
entrepreneurial wealth is given away at a rate six times that of inherited wealth.
A final feature of giving by the wealthy is that they give to a dramatically
diﬀerent set of recipients. In particular, while religious causes are the target of
a large percentage of contributions across the entire population, wealthy donors
give almost nothing to religious charities. Looking at charitable bequests alone,
Auten et al. (2000) calculated that estates of less that $1 million give 27% to
religious causes, estates of about $5 million gave about 13% to religion, estates
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of about $10 million gave about 6% to religion, but estates over $20 million gave
less than 1 percent to religious charities.
Table 9
Giving in Estates
Wealth at Death Total Giving Bequest
(in $1 million) (in $1000) Share
Under 1 129 0%
1 to 2.5 213 12.2%
2.5 to 5 452 6.9%
5 to 10 728 26.4%
10 to 20 1,851 28.9%
20 to 50 6,059 51.6%
50 to 100 8,533 59.5%
100 and over 244,907 77.6%
Source: Joulfaian (2001)
7.3. Tax Elasticity of Gifts in Life and at Death
A central question for policy makers is how does the estate tax eﬀect giving by
the wealthy, both in life and at death. As such, we define “very wealthy” as
whether the taxpayer faces exposure to the estate tax. Two recent studies have
made important contributions to this issue.
First, David Joulfaian (2000) notes that prior studies of the estate tax focused
only on its eﬀect on charitable bequests, ignoring the prospect that the estate tax
can also aﬀect gifts during life. Joulfaian accounts for both by employing to a
10 year panel of individual income tax returns and those same individuals’ estate
tax returns. Joulfaian limits his sample to only those with possible exposure to
the estate tax.38
Joulfaian estimates estate-tax price elasticities, income-tax price elasticities,
and income elasticities on total giving (in life and at death) under various specifi-
cations. He finds estate tax price elasticities are positive, ranging between 1.1 and
1.7. He finds income tax price elasticities around −2.8 for all specifications and
wealth elasticities of roughly 1.0 for most specifications. Combining the eﬀects,
38During the period of his sample, all estates with gross assets over $600,000 were required
to file estate tax returns. These filings, including those which owe no taxes, are included in
Joulfaian’s sample.
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Joulfaian claims that a repeal of the estate tax would reduce total contributions
by up to over 30%, depending on the specification.
A second paper, by Bakija, Gale, and Slemrod (2003), focuses on the eﬀect of
federal and state inheritance taxes on charitable bequests. The study is notable for
the scope of its data, which draws on virtually every federal estate tax return filed
since 1945. The returns contain information on state of residence which they use
to calculate the total tax rates faced by decedents. They estimate both price and
wealth elasticities under several specifications. Under the most straightforward
specification, they estimate a price elasticity of −1.62 and a wealth elasticity
of 1.32. Both estimates have extremely low standard errors. Under their most
inclusive specification which controls for wealth, states of residence, and years,
they estimate a significantly greater price elasticity of −2.14 and an only slightly
higher wealth elasticity of 1.55.
This paper is also noteworthy for its interpretation of the elasticity estimates.
They argue that due to the progressivity of the estate tax, its total repeal would
increase the price of charitable giving by a much greater percentage than such
a repeal would increase wealth. For the average individual in their sample, the
absence of the estate tax would have increased the price of charitable bequests
by 77% while only increasing disposable wealth by 24%. Therefore, they argue,
wealth elasticities would have to be three times greater than price elasticities in
order for a repeal to have a neutral eﬀect on charitable bequests. Since their range
of estimates show wealth elasticities at most on par with price elasticities, they
predict a repeal would result in a significant reduction of charitable bequests.
8. Giving Time
While we have thus far focused on gifts of money, charities also benefit from sub-
stantial gifts of time. Americans are especially generous volunteers. According
to a recent national survey, 44% of respondents claimed to give time to a chari-
table organization in the prior year, with volunteers averaging about 15 hours of
volunteer time per month.39
These gifts of time clearly have great value to the charitable sector, and it
seems important for policy makers to understand the influences of volunteering,
the value of volunteering, and its interaction with gifts of money. The question of
the joint determination of time and money gifts is especially important. Suppose,
39Independent Sector, Giving and Volunteering in the United States, 2001, Washington, D.C.
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for instance, that time and money gifts are substitutes. Then a policy, like the
charitable deduction, that increases gifts of money may have the eﬀect of reducing
gifts of time. Any policy analysis would overstate the benefits by ignoring the
tradeoﬀ between time and money. On the other hand, suppose time and money
gifts are complements. Then the subsidy to money will have the added benefit
of producing more time contributions as well, and the policy would be even more
beneficial than thought before.
What can economic theory tell us about the complementarity or substitutabil-
ity of gifts of time and money? It turns out, this depends critically on the as-
sumptions we make on givers’ preferences.
8.1. Theoretical Framework for Volunteering
Let mbe an individual’s money gift and v be volunteer hours. Let xbe consump-
tion, `be leisure hours. Let t be the marginal tax rate applied to market wages,
and t0 be the marginal tax rate applied to charitable deductions. For itemizers
t = t0, but for non-itemizers t0 = 0. Then w(1− t) is the after-tax wage the person
earns in the market, and 1− t0 is the price of giving. Let wo be non-labor income
and assume a time endowment of 1. Then all givers face the budget constraint
x + (1− t0)m = wo + w(1− t)(1− `− v). Notice that w(1− t), the opportunity
cost of leisure, is also the price of volunteering.40
Then a simple first model would assume individuals are warm-glow givers who
care only about the dollars they give away and the hours they volunteer. That is,
givers have the simple preferences:
Model 1: u(x, `,m, v)
Model 1 give us no guidance as to whether time and money are complements
or substitutes–it all depends on preferences. Model 2 will change this.
Notice that Model 1 assumes that individuals care about their expenditures
on diﬀerent components of their donation, that is the dollars and hours they give.
Since giving is motivated by some altruistic concern for the charity, it may make
40Periodically there is a call in the public press, and even among some economists, to make
volunteer time “tax deductible.” This budget constraint reveals that it in fact already is. By
working an hour for the charity, at an opportunity cost of w(1 − t), there is no net impact on
tax liabilities.. The same is true if the hour was worked in the market and the pre-tax wage
was given to charity. Hence, tax law treats time and money gifts identically–both gifts escape
income taxation.
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more sense to assume that individuals care about the impact of their contribution
instead. That is, volunteers may ask, “What are my hours worth to the charity?”
It seems reasonable that a volunteering attorney would get more satisfaction by
giving free legal advice to the charity than from mopping its floors, and he would
feel like each hour he gives contributes more to the charity. Let w0 be the wage
imputed to the activity the individual volunteers for. One can think of this as
the wage the charity would have to pay to contract for these services in the
market.41 It thus makes sense to think individuals care about the total value of
their contribution, both money and time. That is, they care about c = m+ w0v.
Individuals thus have preferences
Model 2: u(x, `,m+ w0v)
Notice that Model 2 assumes that individuals gain no extra utility from volun-
teering per se, apart from how it increases the total value of their contribution c.
Likewise, they get no independent warm-glow from money gifts. This assumption
now makes time and money perfect substitutes–givers care about which creates
more value for the charity. In fact, one can see that from a technological point of
view, time and money gifts should be perfect substitutes. It is only preferences
for giving in one form or the other that should create complementarity.
The simple observation of Model 2 creates a stark prediction. First, since m
and v are perfect substitutes, people should tend to choose one or the other. But,
suppose people work in a competitive labor market, and choose their labor hours
optimally–they aren’t constrained to work more or fewer hours than they desire,
and they work in the best paying job their skills will support. Then it must be that
w ≥ w0, that is, the wage earned in the labor market exceeds the wage imputed
to the volunteer activity.42 Why? If not then the worker could switch jobs and be
made better oﬀ. Stated diﬀerently, people can only volunteer for jobs that they
are over-qualified for. The lawyer can volunteer his legal expertise or can mop
the organization’s floors, but a janitor cannot provide legal advice. Now suppose
an individual is considering spending an hour volunteering, thus donating w0v,
or spending another hour in the labor force and donating the money she earns.
If gifts are fully deductible and p = 1 − t, then working an extra hour means
she can donate the pre-tax wage w. Hence, as long as w > w0, this person will
strictly prefer working and giving money rather than volunteering time. If people
41Freeman (1997) oﬀers evidence that, in fact, w and w0 are highly correlated..
42The payroll tax creates a wedge that may cause this to be contradicted.
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care about the total value of their donations, therefore, volunteering should be
extremely rare among itemizers.
As noted at the top of this section, volunteering is anything but rare. So,
while Model 2 captures some interesting and surely important features of the
giving decision, it cannot explain much of the data. There needs to be some
independent warm-glow ascribed to volunteering itself. This suggests the final
model is likely to be the best guide to thinking about volunteering is
Model 3: u(x, `,m+ w0v,m, v)
This model contains Models 1 and 2 as special cases. But, as shown by Andreoni,
Gale, Scholz, and Straub (2004), to the extent that people care about total value
of donation, there should be a fundamental bias in the data toward giving money
first. Only after the marginal warm-glow of money gifts falls should people switch
to giving time. That is, we should be more likely to see time gifts follow money
gifts than vice versa.43
8.2. Empirical Studies on Gifts of Time and Money
One of the first empirical studies of volunteering was by Menchik and Weisbord
(1987), using the 1974 National Survey on Philanthropy. They considered Model
1 above, and focused solely on hours, not dollars, given. They found volunteering
is sensitive to the market wage rate, with a elasticity of −0.4. Including the price
of money donations in their regression, they found that time and money are gross
complements–the higher the cost of giving cash gifts, the less people give time.
In the remainder of this section we will discuss the findings of three recent studies
that explored the joint determinants of time and money.
Brown and Lankford (1992) are the first to look at time and money gifts in the
same model. They used a special sample of Florida households in 1984. The survey
asked about giving and volunteering of the respondent in the prior year. Their
sample included 915 females and 717 males. Over 55% of respondents who work
full time reported volunteering, and over 65% of retirees reported volunteering.
All respondents averaged 7.4 hours of volunteering per month.
43Why might time gifts have independent warm-glow? First is the simple joy of being involved.
Second is that volunteering helps gather information about how the organization spends money,
so has value as an oversight tool. Finally, Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) hypothesize that
individuals volunteer to learn valuable job skills or to make contacts useful in the future. They
find some weak evidence to support this view.
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Brown and Lankford estimated a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model
on time and money gifts. Because of possible diﬀerences in time gifts by sex,
they estimated a three-equation model, one equation for money gifts, one for time
gifts by women, and one for time gifts by men. As suggested by the theoretical
model above, they find that the probability of giving time conditional on giving
money is twice as high as the probability of giving money conditional on giving
time (0.49 versus 0.25). This is consistent with a concern for the total value of
a contribution, thus reflecting the natural tendency for time and money to be
substitutes. However, they also find the correlations of the error terms in the
SUR analysis to be large and positive. While this could be caused by individual
heterogeneity in the cross section, it could also mean that preferences are indeed
imposing a complementarity. This is also reflected in the large and negative cross
price elasticities, estimated by Brown and Lankford to be −1.79.44
While these two studies seem to point to significant complementarity, two
other studies indicate substitutability. Freeman (1997) uses 1990 survey data
from Independent Sector to regress ln(volunteer hours) − ln(money donations)
on ln(wage). Since the wage is the relative cost of volunteering, this coeﬃcient
is an indicator of the elasticity of substitution between time and money gifts.
Freeman finds a large negative coeﬃcient, indicating substantial substitution–
those with higher wages favor gifts of money.45 Duncan (1999) uses the same
data set considered by Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) and explicitly explores the
hypothesis that time and money are perfect substitutes. His results are mixed,
but he is unable to reject the perfect substitutes hypothesis.
The published literature leaves open the question of whether time and money
are complements or substitutes. Of course, estimation of volunteerism is hampered
by all of the same diﬃculties discussed in the section on gifts of money. However,
in this case the identification of the eﬀect of the tax-subsidy to giving is even
more severe. The marginal tax rate is also going to keenly influence the elasticity
44Brown and Lankford conduct a final interesting policy experiment. What happens to vol-
unteerism by women if those out of the labor force suddenly begin to work full time? The
reduction in time available reduces volunteering, but the income eﬀect increases it. The net
eﬀect, they report, is that this would lead women to cut back volunteering by a little over 30
minutes per week. Similar conclusions were reported by Tiehen (2000) who studied female labor
and volunteering trends from 1965 to 1993. Little of the decline in female volunteering could be
attributed to labor market participation.
45Freeman’s estimates, however, assume that the price of giving is one. In fact the price
of giving should fall as the wage goes up, which should reduce this estimated elasticity of
substitution and weaken his claim.
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of labor supply, which will aﬀect the propensity to volunteer. Most of the data
on volunteering does not also include hours worked in the market. Although they
recognized this problem, Brown and Lankford could not fully address it, and were
forced to take available hours as exogenous. On the other side, Freeman’s analysis
made no attempt to account for the charitable deduction on volunteer hours.
In sum, the literature on time and money contributions is in great flux, and
there has yet to be a definitive study to address this gap.
9. Fund-Raising: Charities as Strategic Players
Both the theoretical and empirical analysis presented thus far have assumed that
charities have no active role to play in extracting donations from potential givers.
In fact, fund-raising is a vibrant, innovative and highly professional industry with
trade organizations and professional accreditation–one university even oﬀers a
professional degree in fund-raising. According to one estimate, about 115,000
organizations hire fund-raising staﬀ and consultants, spending $2 billion per year
on fund-raising. In 1995 the twenty-five largest charities spent an average of over
$25 million each on fund-raising, or about 14 percent of charitable gifts.46
This raises several important questions. What role do fund-raisers play in
aﬀecting the gifts received by charities? How do they respond to government
policy? How do they aﬀect the eﬃciency of the goods provided?
Understanding the institution of fund-raising can be quite important in set-
ting policy toward charities. Consider the following suggestive evidence. In the
1980s there were severe reductions in marginal tax rates. The economists’ mod-
els predicted a steep decline in giving. However, giving over this period seemed
largely to follow trends established years earlier.47 At the same time, the popular
press reported a new phenomenon called “donor fatigue.” As charities faced an
anticipated loss in revenues, they became more aggressive in soliciting donors,
leading donors to feel tapped-out. In response, press reports account, charities
were adapting to the new situation by altering their fund-raising tactics.48 Char-
46See Andreoni (1998) for more discussion of these and other facts about fund-raising.
47See Clotfelter (1990) for a discussion of the response to the 1980s tax reforms. See also
Figure 1 in this paper.
48For instance, the Wall Street Journal, July 13, 1989,(Section 2; Page 1, Column 3), in an
article entitled “Charities Shift Marketing Tactics in a Bid to Oﬀset ‘Donor Fatigue,’ ” reports
that, “Donor fatigue has become a major marketing roadblock for charities that need to raise
money steadily, year after year.” They go on to report that, “Charities are revamping their
marketing eﬀorts in attempt to reach new audiences of potential donors.”
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ities, it seems, were responding strategically to changes in government policy,
which in turn could have mitigated its eﬀect. Because economic analysis had not
accounted for the strategic response of fund-raisers, it made incorrect predictions
about the consequences of policy changes.
Economists have only just begun to take seriously the eﬀects of fund-raising
in understanding the strategic equilibrium of charity markets.49 The reason, in
part, is that it remains a diﬃcult area to study. First, there is very little direct
information on fund-raising. Some data sets include measures of dollars spent on
fund-raising, but there is no systematic evidence on fund-raising practices. One is
left to scour fund-raisers’ training manuals and “how-to” books for generalizable
facts about fund-raising tactics. Second, it is diﬃcult to establish theoretically
how fund-raising works. The problem is similar to that of advertising–how do
these eﬀorts alter or facilitate demands for giving?
Next I give an overview of the budding theoretical and empirical literatures on
fund-raising. The theoretical literature separates fund-raising into two categories,
capital campaigns and continuing campaigns. Capital campaigns characterize new
charities, or major new initiatives of existing charities, such as buying expensive
equipment, constructing new buildings, opening a new oﬃce, or expanding to
include a new type of service. Hence, capital campaigns have two distinctive fea-
tures. First is possibly large fixed costs of capitalization, and second is incomplete
information about the quality or success of the project.
Continuing campaigns, by contrast, raise the operating funds for ongoing char-
ities, funding things like salaries, direct services, supplies and maintenance. It is
unlikely that continuing campaigns can be built around revealing information
about the charity. As a result, models of continuing campaigns have focused on
revealing information about the donors. We consider each type of fund drive in
turn.
9.1. Capital Campaigns
In building models, we first need to collect the stylized facts that can shape our
models. Below is a partial list.
49Rose-Ackerman (1982) provides the first major theoretical model that includes fund-raising.
Rather than explain how fund-raising works, she shows how free entry into a charity “market”
with slight “product diﬀerentiation” can lead to socially ineﬃcient amounts of fund-raising–a
monopoly charity could raise as much revenue with lower fund-raising expense. The reason is
that some fund-raising is shifting gifts across charities rather than creating new gifts.
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• Capital campaigns have three phases: Research, Silent Phase, and
General Campaign. Capital campaigns are nearly universally character-
ized by these three phases.50 In the research phase the organization identifies
potential donors who could give significant funds. In the silent phase the
charity attempts to collect about one third of its ultimate goal from a small
number of these large donors, perhaps even one. The general campaign then
collects the rest in relatively small donations.
• Capital campaigns announce gifts, especially the first gift or group
of gifts. This observation is important because it defies economic reasoning–
in a simple model like those of Section 3 above, announcing gifts should only
encourage free riding, especially when those gifts are large.51
• Wealthy “leadership givers” give first, and make extraordinary
gifts. Large gifts, often called leadership gifts, are used to start major
fund drives. Why do they come at the beginning rather than the middle or
end?
• Some gifts are meant as “seed grants” that spur others to give.
Fund-raisers hate anonymous gifts, since they say that large publicly given
gifts can be used to encourage others to donate.52 Some philanthropists are
committed to providing “challenge grants” that are meant as examples for
others to follow.53
We have two features of capital campaigns to use as foundations for explaining
these facts: potential fixed costs of capitalization, and incomplete information on
the quality of the new project. Below I will introduce three classes of models and
motivate how they can explain the stylized facts.
Model 1: Full Information on Quality, Fixed Costs of Capitalization
This analysis is based on Andreoni (1988). Consider building a business school
on campus. Unless the university can raise a minimum amount of money, the
50See Andreoni (1988) for a discussion of sundry sources for this claim.
51See, e.g., Varian (1994a) for a discussion of sequentially provided public goods.
52New York Times, November 18, 1998, “Got a Match? If Not, You Lose the Grant,” by David
Firestone, says “When a big (leadership giver) comes in, the smaller donors pay attention. It
legitimizes a fund-raising project and puts the institution on a much faster track.”.
53Notables are Brook Atsor and foundations, like the Kresge Foundation. See Potters, Sefton
and Vesterlund (2005) for discussion of this evidence.
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building cannot be built. However, if it exceeds this minimum, the quality of
the building can rise with the dollars donated. That is, there are fixed costs (or
increasing returns) of providing the public good. How does this observation aﬀect
the model of privately provided public goods?
Return to the model of section 3 above. First, ignore the fixed cost and suppose
there exists an interior equilibrium. Call this G∗ =
Pn
i=1 g
∗
i . Now, add in the fixed
costs by redefining the level of the public good this way:
G =
½ Pn
i=1 gi if
Pn
i=1 gi ≥ G
0 if
Pn
i=1 gi < G
where G is the minimum amount needed before the public good can be built.
Suppose thatG < G∗, so that the original Nash equilibrium remains. However,
this threshold G can also create a second Nash equilibrium at zero gifts. Suppose
everyone is giving zero, and that G is so large that no one individual would be
willing to give G as a best reply. Then gi = 0 for all i will be a Nash equilibrium.
Without some eﬀorts to get the economy over the threshold G, no public goods
will be provided.
What’s the solution? The “silent phase” of fund-raising. If the charity can
raise enough dollars to assure people that the threshold G will be met, then the
interior equilibrium G∗ will be attained. Let bG−i be the solution to u(mi+ bG−i−
G,G) ≡ u(m, 0). Then bG−i is the amount of giving by others that makes i indif-
ferent from making a gift to cover the threshold and not. Let bGS be the minimum
among all of these bG−i’s. If the fund-raiser can raise bGS in the silent phase, per-
haps in the form of binding pledges54, then moving to the general campaign phase
will be successful. Notice that bGS is below the technological threshold G, so these
gifts themselves do not need to be enough to guarantee the good is built, but they
must be enough to assure that the threshold G will be met.
This fixed cost of public goods now gives a purpose to fund-raising. There must
be concerted and coordinated eﬀorts to secure a significant fraction of the funds
ultimately needed before a general fund drive can be announced.55 This model can
capture three of the stylized facts above: A silent phase organizes a few wealthy
donors first, announces their gifts, and these spur others to give. Next we look at
models that can also explain why some leadership gifts are extraordinarily large.
54The fund-raiser could employ a common mechanism for providing bGS among a small number
of rich donors. For example, the subscription mechanism of Admati and Perry (1991).
55They also show that governments or foundations can also provide the needed bGS . See List
and Lucking-Reiley (2002) for an experimental demonstration of this eﬀect.
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Model 2: Unknown Quality that can be Learned in Advance
We now focus on incomplete information. Suppose a charity can be of two qual-
ities. If quality is 0 then the good is “worthless” and everyone would prefer it
not be built. Or the quality can be 1, in which case people would prefer to build.
Assume that the probability that the good is worthless is high enough that no
one is willing to build the public good without some additional confidence on the
quality. Suppose that by paying a cost c > 0 an individual can learn the true
quality. Vesterlund (2003) analyzes a model of this sort and assumes that the
charity has the strategic choice of first soliciting a contribution from a particular
individual, and then adopting a policy of announcing this person’s contribution or
not. What can a potential giver glean from a charity that chooses not to announce
contributions?
Vesterlund shows that in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium all of the high-quality
charities will choose to announce gifts, and zero-quality charities will be indiﬀerent
to announcing and not. The selected first-giver will pay the cost c of learning
information only if the charity announces gifts. If the gift is positive, then people
will infer the quality is good. In this model the charity signals its quality by
announcing gifts, and the informed first-giver signals the quality of the charity by
making a large gift.
Andreoni (2006) builds on this result by assuming a good charity can be of two
possible qualities, high, H, or low, L. People prefer to build a charity of either
quality, but are willing to pay more for the high quality charity. This creates an
interesting dilemma for a giver who learns that the quality is only L. He prefers
to fool others into thinking that the quality is H, in which case they would give
more to the public good, for which the first-giver will benefit. This means that if
he actually does observe quality H, he cannot simply give the amount that would
be consistent with common knowledge of high quality–people would assume the
quality is low. Instead, the first-giver must make a gift that separates a quality H
from quality L. That means that the lead giver must give an extra-large donation,
larger than he would if H were common knowledge. This explains why first givers
give large gifts, but why are they also rich? This is a question of who will volunteer
to move first and provide this extra-large leadership gift. Building on results of
Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996a, 1996b), Andreoni (2006) shows that this war-of-
attrition will lead the richest giver to be the lead giver since they have the lowest
opportunity cost of providing the signal. This now explains the final stylized
fact–leadership givers are the wealthy and they make extraordinarily large gifts.
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Model 3: Unknown Quality that Can Only be Learned by Experience.
A feature of seed grants not captured by the models above is that they are some-
times in the form of experiments. Suppose the quality of the charitable project
can only be learned after it is in operation. If the charity performs well, then
the next year it can be expanded. The more of the good we provide this year,
the faster we learn about its merit. But this means gifts have two positive ex-
ternalities. First, they provide charitable services; and second, they allow us to
learn about the quality of the charity. But this simply compounds the free-rider
problem since now people have two reasons to let someone else give first.
Consider a world with risk averse agents with identical preferences but diﬀerent
degrees of income. For this case, construct a model in which public goods can
grow like snowballs over time.56 Because of decreasing absolute risk aversion, the
rich will give first–they are most able to absorb the risk of a low-quality charity.
If the experiment goes well and potential givers become more confident that the
quality is good, the next people down the income distribution become willing to
give as well. As time goes on good charities grow in both dollars donated and
numbers of givers, while bad charities shrink and fade away.
9.2. Continuing Campaigns
Continuing campaigns are about raising money for an established charity. The
funds pay the operating expenses of the organization. Here are some of the stylized
facts on continuing campaigns:
• The Power of the Ask. Both charities and donors report that the most
eﬀective fund-raising tool is to directly ask someone to donate.
• Donor are Recognized. Donors see their names printed in the program
for the opera or in the alumni magazine, or hear their name broadcast over
public radio. Often donations are reported in broad categories rather than
by exact amounts.
• Charity Raﬄes and Auctions. These devices often generate surpluses
when run by charities that far exceed what raﬄes or auctions would get in
the absence of a charitable beneficiary.
56See Yildirim (2003), and Bolton and Harris (1999) on strategic experimentation.
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The literature on continuing campaigns is organized around these stylized
facts. The focus of the models is often on how charities can manipulate the
incentives to provide “social rewards” to donors, such as recognition, and how
charities might compete with each other for attracting donors’ dollars. Again, I
present summaries of the diﬀerent models.
Model 4: The Power of the Ask: Latent Demands for Giving
An iron law of fund-raising is that people tend not to give unless they are asked.
Why would someone with a desire to give wait until they get a mailing or phone
call? Andreoni and Payne (2003) build a model in which donors have latent
demands to give, but transaction costs such as finding the address or simple
procrastination keep them from giving. When contacted by a charity, their costs
fall dramatically and so they give. The models assumes that charities diﬀer on
some dimension θ, and that each donor has a favorite θ. If contacted by several
charities, donors give to the one whose θ is closest to their favorite. The closer
the charity is to their ideal, the more the donor gives. Thus, solicitations increase
donations for two reasons. First, they turn non-donors into donors; and second,
they move givers to charities they prefer.
Andreoni and Payne (2003) then ask what happens to fund-raising eﬀorts
when a charity gets a grant from the government. The answer is fund-raising
falls. This is due in part to classic crowding out, but also to the fact that any
solicitation is likely to be less productive, so charities will choose to conduct fewer
of them. The net eﬀect of the grant is then to reduce donations to the recipient
charity, some of which are lost altogether and some of which shift to competing
charities. Hence, we can observe crowding out in part because donors give less,
but also because charities ask for less. However, even if fewer dollars are given
to the organization receiving the grant, some of those dollars are given instead
to other firms. Analyses that ignore these two eﬀects–the endogeneity of fund-
raising and the shifting of donations to competing charities–will overstate the
problem of crowding out.
Model 5: Donor Recognition: Signals of Wealth, Altruism or Prestige
Charities often provide public recognition to donors. They publish names of
donors or give them tokens, such as coﬀee mugs, to display to others. Some
of this eﬀect may be psychological–givers are showing pride, avoiding shame,
or bowing to social pressure, as suggested in experiments by Andreoni and Petrie
(2004) and Rege and Telle (2004). Romano and Yildirim (2001) show theoretically
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that if donors are aﬀected this way, which they characterize generically as “snob-
appeal,” then announcing donations can produce competition among donors to
appear generous. Taking a diﬀerent approach, Glazer and Konrad (1996) suggest
that donors may also be using charitable gifts as a way to signal their wealth to
others. Giving may be an especially good form of “burning money” since it has
the added benefit of helping the world and of lending some prestige to the donor.
Harbaugh (1998a) notes that a clever charity can capitalize on donors’ desires
for prestige by manipulating the reports of donors. For instance, rather than re-
porting exact dollar donations, suppose charities reported donations in categories,
such as “gave $1000 to $2000”. By carefully selecting these categories, fund-raisers
can nudge people to increase their donations in order to qualify for the next higher
reporting category. Of course, poorly selected categories can have the opposite
eﬀect. Harbaugh (1998b) shows the eﬀect empirically–gifts to a law school’s fund
drive were almost exclusively made at the lower end of each reporting bracket.57
Model 6: Charity Raﬄes: Endogenous Subsidies
Morgan (2000) and Morgan and Sefton (2000) ask why a charity might hold a
lottery to raise money. Consider a lottery with prize P that is not connected to a
charity. Let gi be the number of lottery tickets purchased by i and G =
Pn
i=1 gi.
Then define pi = gi/G as i’s chance of winning the lottery. Then a risk-neutral
person endowed with mi maximizes utility
ui = mi − gi +
gi
G
P.
It is easy to show that at the optimum, GL = P (n− 1)/n, so that profits of the
lottery are π = GL − P = −P/n < 0. The lottery will lose money.
Next consider a charity apart from the lottery. Suppose the individuals have
quasi-linear utility, and that they care about the charitable services in excess of
some fixed costs P , so utility is
ui = mi − gi + ln(G− P ).
It is easy to show that the equilibrium donations will be GC = P +1, so that net
charitable services are GC−P = 1. Notice, this holds for any P , including P = 0,
and any n.
57Andreoni and Petrie (2004) verify the eﬀect in an experiment.
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Now couple the lottery with a charity. Individuals maximize utility
ui = mi − gi +
gi
G
P + ln(G− P )
= mi − gi(1−
P
G
) + ln(G− P )
Notice that now the lottery acts like a subsidy on giving, with subsidy rate P/G.
Rather than coming externally from a government, however, the subsidy is en-
dogenous to the charity. It is again easy to show that the solution to this will yield
GCL > P + 1 = GC ; that is, the combination of the lottery and the charity will
yield profits for the lottery and these profits will exceed the donations received
without the lottery.58 This result follows from any quasi-linear utility function.
Note the rather striking result. A lottery that would lose money by itself is
profitable when coupled with a public good. Moreover, the profits exceed ordinary
voluntary donations. The logic of this can be seen in the interpretation of the
lottery as a subsidy to giving. Suppose G < P. Then the price of giving, 1 −
P/G, is actually negative–the charity essentially pays people to give. This alone
guarantees the charity will break even. At GCL − P = GC , the lottery is still
subsidizing the price for givers, further guaranteeing the success of the lottery at
raising charitable revenues.
9.3. What remains to be done
Notice that in modeling fund-raising, we are describing actual mechanisms that
are used to increase, or at least attract, donations to public goods. These models
are, thus far, positive models that attempt to understand the broadest facts, and
to provide a justification for fund-raisers to enter the model. Perhaps one of
the most interesting aspects of charitable “markets” not captured by any of these
models is that fund-raising strategies have evolved and developed in a competitive
market among charities. Those with the best products and the best fund-raising
strategies will be the ones to survive in the market. In this sense, the charities
themselves are designing mechanisms for providing public goods, but these must
58In this case, solving for the first order conditions, summing across all i, yields
n− 1
n
=
G
P
µ
1− 1
G− P
¶
which can only hold if G− P > 1.
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satisfy an added constraint that is not common in the mechanism design literature,
in particular, that their fund-raising scheme survive innovation by others. In this
sense, charities practice “organic mechanism design”–they design mechanisms
that must not only be incentive compatible and individually rational, but must
also survive the marketplace of mechanisms used by competing charities.
Some new additions to the mechanism design literature are beginning to re-
semble fund-raising mechanisms. These “natural” mechanisms are simple and
easily employed. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989, 1992) show how one can use re-
peated hill-climbing techniques to build up a public good in discrete jumps over
time. Admati and Perry (1991) show that a subscription mechanism of mutually
binding promises of the sort, “I’ll pay X if you pay Y ” can reach eﬃciency. In a
similar vein, Varian (1994b) shows that people can oﬀer to subsidize each other
and improve eﬃciency. Marx and Matthews (2000), in an especially important
contribution, show that repeated simultaneous contributions can, in a long enough
horizon, always reach the threshold for provision of a discrete public good when
it is eﬃcient to do so. By insisting on models that reflect something in reality,
these normative models can be bridges or building blocks for the literature based
on the positive models above.
Perhaps the most important way models of fund-raising can aﬀect economic
analysis is in empirical studies. The empirical analysis outlined above implic-
itly takes the fund-raising strategies as treating people symmetrically in a cross-
section, and implicitly treats them as constant in a time series. Of course, as we
have seen in the models above, fund-raising strategies are likely to be aﬀected by
government policies, so neglecting how fund-raising is responding to a period of
tax reform, for instance, may be leaving an important piece of the puzzle out of
the model. We turn to these concerns in the next section.
10. Empirical Analyses of Fund-Raising, Government Grants
and Crowding Out
The theoretical models of the last section indicate that government grants and
charitable fund-raising are likely to be jointly determined, hence when looking at
the eﬀects of one we should really also consider the other. In doing so, there are
two important questions. First, do government grants crowd out private giving?
The theoretical models of section 3.2 suggest they should. We call this the classic
crowding out hypothesis. But if warm-glow is dominant, as section 3.5 demon-
strates, then perhaps crowding out will be slight. The second question is, are
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charities net-revenue maximizers? If a charity is acting like a business, it should
spend dollars on fund-raising until the marginal dollar spent raises an additional
dollar of funds. If instead charities are “satisficers” who have revenue goals and
stop when they are reached, then marginal revenues may exceed marginal costs.
This section will review the recent contributions to this literature. We begin
by looking at some important studies that provide a background for later analysis.
10.1. Background Studies
Two recent studies, using similar methods and data, give some insights into these
two questions. Okten and Weisbrod (2000) consider panel data from charitable
organizations, with data drawn from IRS Form 990 filings. Khanna, Posnett
and Sandler (1995) consider a panel of comparable data for the UK. Both use
similar methods and build on their prior studies on a single cross-section (Weisbrod
and Dominguez, 1986, Posnett and Sandler, 1989). The main innovation of this
analysis is to assume that total donations depend on a variable they call price,
P . The justification for this variable comes from the assumption that donors may
suﬀer from a “plausible irrationality” (Rose-Ackerman, 1982) that individuals
confuse marginal dollars spent on fund-raising with average dollars spent. For
example, people who observe that, on average, a charity spends 20% of its revenues
on fund-raising will assume that only 80% of their own dollars go to charitable
services. Let f equal the ratio of fund-raising expenses to total expenditures of the
charity. Then these authors define price as P = 1/(1−f). The hypothesis is that
donations should be negatively related to this price.59 Then the basic regression
equation estimated is
Cit = βo + β1Fit−1 + β2Pit−1 + β3Git−1 +BXit + ²it
where C is total charitable contributions, F is fund-raising expenses, G is gov-
ernment grants, and X is other variables such other revenues and the age of
the organization.60 Note that current contributions depend on lagged exogenous
variables.
59Okten andWeisbrod define price as (1−t)/(1−f) where t is the marginal tax rate applying to
the charitable deduction. However, they consider lnP in their regression, making this distinction
moot. Khanna, Posnett and Sandler (1995) define price as 1/(1− f − a), where a is the ratio of
administrative expenses to donations. Interpreting this as a price requires the same “plausible
irrationality.”
60In Okten and Weisbrod (2000), these variables are defined as logs, while in Khana, Posnett
and Sandler (1995) they are in levels.
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While the interpretation and motivation for P can be debated61, the inclusion
of this variable in a regression equation is important, especially when fund-raising
expenses F enter the equation directly as well as indirectly in P . In particular, we
can appeal to any number of explanations from the theory models above to predict
that there will be a net-revenue maximizing level of fund-raising, F. This means
that in the neighborhood of the optimum the contributions function should be
concave, with random events putting charities sometimes to the left and sometimes
to the right of the optimum. As a result, a positive coeﬃcient β1 on F would
imply that we should also observe a negative coeﬃcient β2 on P , simply due to
the concavity of the contributions revenue function.
These authors consider several estimation strategies, including adding fixed
eﬀects to the estimation, and both papers come to similar conclusions. First, they
find that, as predicted, the relationship between contributions and fund-raising is
concave; β1 > 0 and β2 < 0. Okten and Weisbrod find that the net eﬀect is that
charities fall short of net-revenue maximization, consistent with satisficing. By
contrast, Khanna, et al.find that UK charities are net-revenue maximizers.
Turning to crowding out, both find that the coeﬃcient on G is approximately
zero. In fact, the point estimates for both studies indicate β4 is positive but
insignificant. The authors interpret this as providing evidence that crowding
out is not important, and that there may even be “crowding in.” Both results,
however, have recently been questioned, as we see next.
10.2. Endogeneity Bias in Grants
Payne (1998) oﬀers an important challenge to this interpretation of crowding
out.62 She notes that the government oﬃcials who approve the grants are elected
by the same people who make donations to charities. Hence, positive feelings
toward a particular charity will be represented in both the preferences of givers
and of the government. To illustrate, consider both government and private giving
to disaster relief in the year of a great tragedy, such as a hurricane, flood, or 9/11
attacks. Both private and public giving are going to be higher, leading to a bias
against finding crowding out.63
61See Steinberg (1991) for a critique.
62See also Payne (2001) on crowding-in at research universities.
63A more subtle endogeneity issue is raised by Coate (1995). Because charities cannot commit
to not help those in need, the government (conditional on a binding budget constraint) will
strategically use private charity to supplement it’s own provision of public goods. It is unclear
how this will bias coeﬃcients, especially in the presence of many goods.
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To examine this, Payne used data similar to Okten and Weisbrod, a panel
of 430 nonprofits for 10 years. She restricts the sample to only those nonprof-
its that provide local services. Repeating simple OLS analysis of the sort done
prior to her study, she replicates the finding–point estimates indicating near zero
crowding out. She then turns to two-stage least squares analysis to address the
problem of endogeneity. As an instrument for government grants she uses ag-
gregate government transfers to individuals in the state. This is something that
should be correlated with the political power of representatives in the state, but
not correlated with demands for charity.
Her approach is extremely successful. She finds that estimates of crowding
out now rise to around 50%–each dollar of government grants generates only 50
cents of new charity. This is a startling and important departure from the prior
literature.
Payne’s analysis did not account for fund-raising expenditure of the charities.
If fund-raising and government grants depend on each other, as shown above,
directly entering fund-raising expenses would lead to biased coeﬃcients. For in-
stance, a charity that applied for and won a large government grant would spend
less eﬀort on fund-raising, or conversely a charity with productive fund-raising
apparatus isn’t as likely to spend eﬀorts on winning grants. In this way, Payne’s
eﬀorts can be seen as a reduced form estimate of the eﬀect of grants on giving,
and it suggests this reduced-form eﬀect is profound. However, it leaves open the
question of the mechanism through which government grants cause a reduction in
donations. Is the eﬀect direct, as in classic crowding out, or is it indirect–people
give less because the charity has opted to spend less eﬀort on fund-raising? We
begin to answer this question next.
10.3. What’s Crowded Out, Giving or Fund-raising?
Andreoni and Payne (2003) ask the simple questions: what happens to a charity’s
fund-raising expenses when it gets a government grant? Does it fall, and by how
much?
To answer these, they again looked at IRS 990 filings, this time on a 14-year
panel of 233 arts organizations and 534 social services organizations. The two
types of organizations were treated separately because of their special diﬀerences.
Arts organizations typically rely heavily on fund-raising, and get relatively few
government grants. Only 10% of their budget comes from grants, and over 50%
from donations. By contrast, social service organizations rely heavily on the gov-
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ernment, with 23% of their budget coming from grants and 26% from donations.
The remainder of both budgets come largely from “program service revenues,”
such as ticket sales or service fees.
The estimation equation of Andreoni and Payne is
Fit = αi + γt + βGit +Oitη + Zitλ+ ²it
where F is fund-raising, G is government grants, O is a vector of organization
variables, and Z a vector of state-specific demographic and political variables.
Notice fixed eﬀects for both the firm and year are included, and that all variables
pertain to the same year.64
In estimating the eﬀect of grants on fund-raising, one must again deal with
endogeneity. As with Payne’s (1998) earlier observation, charities that are in high
demand will likely receive government grants and engage in active fund-raising.
As such, we must instrument grants to remove the positive bias in estimating β.
Andreoni and Payne first estimate the model without accounting for endo-
geneity. They estimate the coeﬃcient β to be positive and significant, indicating
a likely endogeneity bias. They then apply the instrumental variables analysis,
and things turn around dramatically. For art organizations they find that a $1000
increase in grants will reduce fund-raising by $265. For social service organiza-
tions, the reduction would be $54. Extrapolating these eﬀects out, grants decrease
fund-raising by about 52% for arts organizations and 32% for social service orga-
nizations. These reductions are clearly significant.
This study raises an interesting and important question. Do we see crowding
out because people are discouraged directly by the government grants, or because
charities themselves are discouraged from spending money on fund-raising? The
answer to this question could make a critical diﬀerence for policy. Suppose that
all of the reduced giving is due to reduced fund-raising and none is due to classic
crowding out. Then it would be feasible to have a government policy that awarded
grants on the condition that dollars raised through private fund-raising not fall.
Such “matching grants” (or “partially matching grants”) could improve the impact
of grants on charitable services. A matching policy could be desirable, depending
on how the “deadweight loss” of fund-raising compares to the deadweight loss of
taxation (weighted by the crowding factor). Future work will be needed to sort
out these important questions.
64The timing of fund-raising to donations is always unclear–do dollars spent this year yield
donations this year or next year? Andreoni and Payne (2003) provide sensitivity tests, and
discuss this and several other subtle measurement issues in detail.
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A paper by Straub (2003) has begun to look at these issues in the context
of Public Broadcasting in the US. Following on work by Kingma (1989), Straub
estimates a structural model on a panel of public radio stations.65 He finds the
reduction in giving after a grant is due almost entirely to reduced fund-raising, and
not to classic crowding out. Moreover, he estimates a concave “revenue function”
for fund-raising and finds that, by and large, most public radio stations are net-
revenue maximizers, with a few notable exceptions of both kinds. This is a very
clear and compelling study. If these results also hold in more general studies with
other types of charities, the results could profoundly change prevailing views of
crowding out and fund-raising in providing charitable services.
11. Conclusion: The Future of Giving Research
Philanthropy has for decades been one of the most important areas of public
finance research. Millions of people and billions of dollars are devoted to charitable
giving. Moreover, the government’s involvement in both grants to organizations
and subsidies to givers makes it a perennially important public policy topic. Each
new generation of government policy makers will need to know the determinants
of giving and the impacts of grants. For this reason, it will always be a productive
and valued area of research.
Despite its importance, a clear understanding of philanthropy has eluded
economists. One reason is the basic challenge in understanding the motives of
givers–why do people give? We have argued strongly here that the model of
“warm-glow giving” provides a good foundation for analysis. This, however, is
just a partial answer to this question. The concept of warm-glow is only a conve-
nient reduced-form representation for deeper and more complex considerations of
givers. Future work, perhaps combined with laboratory or field experiments, can
help fine-tune the model of givers.
Fine-tuning the model of givers is interesting in its own right, but it becomes
especially important when we begin to analyze philanthropy as a market, with
both suppliers (the givers) and demanders (the fund-raising charities). As we have
argued in this chapter, both sides of this market are active and strategic, and both
are likely to respond to changes in the government policy or other factors in their
environment. Unfortunately, this interaction between the supply and demand for
65Kingma’s often cited paper finds about 13% crowding out in donations to Public Radio.
Manzoor and Straub (2005) fail to replicate Kingma’s findings on a larger set of data, instead
finding roughly no crowding out using Kingma’s methods.
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philanthropy has been largely neglected in both theoretical and empirical analysis.
Clearly, however, its impact is extremely important. Failure to treat philanthropy
as a market has likely led empirical work to overstate the eﬀect of the marginal
tax rate on giving. As policy changes, so do fund-raisers to counteract the change,
so that in the long run the price elasticity of giving may be lower than could be
estimated in a cross-section.
Failing to look at philanthropy as a market has also likely biased our estimates
of crowding out. On the one hand it leads to an understatement of the response.
Because the tastes of government grant-givers are positively correlated with tastes
of individual gift-givers, estimates have likely been biased against crowding out.
On the other hand, by looking at only the “partial equilibrium” of a single charity,
we may also be overstating the eﬀect of crowding out.
To see this, imagine charities in a “monopolistically competitive” market. For
instance, there are several cancer research charities, dozens of world-hunger char-
ities, and hundreds of environmental charities. If one charity gets a major grant
or a large bequest, how do the others respond? How do givers respond? Do they
move their gifts to competing charities in the same market, to charities of another
variety, or do they simply give less overall? Which of these is the right answer
will have a profound eﬀect on how we view crowding out more globally, and how
we asses the cost, incidence and eﬀectiveness of government grants and subsidies.
Another potential for research is in viewing philanthropy as a dynamic mar-
ket. Why, for instance, are there hundreds of environmental organizations? Which
survive in the long run? How does competition for donations shape both the out-
puts of the charity and the fund-raising mechanisms they employ? And, perhaps
most importantly, does this competition promote a sort of “organic mechanism
design” that will move the economy toward eﬃcient mechanisms for the provision
of public goods?
One goal of this chapter has been to collect the state of knowledge on philan-
thropy and to provide a vehicle for the new entrant into this research. A second
and more important goal has been to inspire and promote new interest in larger
and more challenging questions about philanthropy. Despite being an active area
of research for several decades, I view the literature on charitable giving as full of
open questions. As I hope I have conveyed, we are on the doorstep of an exciting
new era for research on philanthropy.
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